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5Abstract
This dissertation encompasses four studies on selected topics in financial regulation and
financial stability. The first paper asks whether there is empirical evidence of cyclicality
in regulatory capital requirements prescribed by Basel regimes. This much debated issue
was until then only addressed in theoretical papers, or simulation studies. While we do
not find evidence on cyclicality in the Basel I or Basel II Standardized Approach, we find
statistically and economically significant evidence concerning Basel II IRB portfolios. The
second paper implements an agent based model to simulate an artificial asset market. This
setup is then used to assess the impact of (i) a short selling ban, (ii) a Tobin Tax like
transaction tax, (iii) mandatory Value-at-Risk limits and (iv) arbitrary combinations of
these. I present results that show that while reducing volatility, a short selling ban nurtures
market bubbles, and a Tobin Tax increases the variance of the returns. In this model a
mandatory risk limit is beneficial from all stability perspectives taken. I examine the
robustness of the model regarding its initial parameterization and show that high levels of
a Tobin Tax lead to substantial market turbulence. The third paper considers the question
which macroeconomic variables are linked to a time series of special interest from a financial
stability perspective: firm defaults. Furthermore, we evaluate the empirical evidence of a
hidden credit cycle by adding a latent factor to our models. We conclude that there is no
empirical support of a hidden credit cycle in Austria once sufficient regressors are included
and industry sectors differ in their respective macro drivers. The forth paper extends this
work by implementing Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) — a modern technique to counter
model uncertainty. Furthermore we enrich this statistical approach by combining BMA with
Bayesian ridge regression. We draw the conclusion that BMA is indeed a powerful tool to
counter model uncertainty. Interest rates and components of inflation are distilled as major
drivers for firm failures in Austria.
6Kurzbeschreibung
Diese Dissertation umfasst vier Studien, die sich jeweils bestimmten Themen der Finanzreg-
ulierung und der Finanzmarktstabilita¨t widmen. Die erste Arbeit geht der Frage nach
empirischen Befunden betreffend die Zyklizita¨t von Eigenmittelerfordernissen unter den
Basel’er Regulierungen nach. Diese oft debattierte Fragestellung wurde bis dato nur
in theoretischen Arbeiten, sowie in auf Simulationsansa¨tzen beruhenden Arbeiten unter-
sucht. Wenngleich die Ergebnisse keine Befunde fu¨r zyklische Eigenmittelanforderungen
unter Basel I und Basel II Standardansatz zeigen, ist die Zyklizita¨t in Basel II IRB Port-
folien statistisch und o¨konomisch signifikant. Die zweite Studie implementiert ein Agent
Based Modell zur Simulation eines ku¨nstlichen Finanzmarktes. In Folge wird dieses Modell
dazu genutzt die Effekte von (i) einem Leerverkaufsverbot, (ii) eine Tobin Steuer a¨hn-
lichen Transaktionssteuer, (iii) einem verpflichtenden Value-at-Risk Limit und (iv) einer
beliebigen Kombination dieser Maßnahmen zu untersuchen und auszuwerten. Die Ergeb-
nisse belegen zwar eine Volatilita¨tsreduktion bei Einfu¨hrung eines Leerverkaufsverbotes,
doch zeigen auch, dass dabei die Bildung von Marktblasen gefo¨rdert wird. Dementgegen
fu¨hrt eine Tobin Steuer tendenziell zu ho¨herer Volatilita¨t. In diesem Modell wirkt ein
verpflichtendes Value-at-Risk Limitsystem als fo¨rderlich aus allen in Betracht gezogenen
Perspektiven der Marktstabilita¨t. Ferner werden Robustheitschecks hinsichtlich der Wahl
der Eingangsparameter durchgefu¨hrt, die ergeben, dass ho¨here Sa¨tze einer Tobin Steuer
mit erheblichen Marktturbulenzen einhergehen. Die dritte Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit der
Frage, welche makroo¨konomischen Variablen mit der aus Sicht der Finanzmarktstabilita¨t
bedeutenden Zeitreihe verknu¨pft sind: Firmenausfa¨llen. Daru¨ber hinaus werden den ange-
wandten Modellen ein latenter Faktor hinzugefu¨gt, um damit empirisch der Existenz eines
verdeckten Kreditzykluses nachzugehen. Sofern genu¨gend Regressoren in den Modellen en-
thalten sind, ergibt sich kein empirischer Beleg fu¨r einen verdeckten Kreditzyklus. Weiters
lassen die Ergebnisse den Schluss zu, dass Sektorspezifika bei der Menge der Risikotreiber
eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Die vierte Arbeit erweitert diese U¨berlegungen, indem sie eine
moderne statistische Technik bei Pra¨senz von Modellunsicherheit, Bayesian Model Aver-
aging (BMA) implementiert. Daru¨ber hinaus wird diese statistische Methodologie durch
Bayesian Ridge Regression komplementiert. Zinssa¨tze und Subkomponenten von Inflation
destillieren sich als wesentliche Risikotreiber fu¨r Firmenausfa¨lle in O¨sterreich.
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Chapter I
Motivation and Overview
This cumulative dissertation comprises four working papers on the effects of financial regu-
lation and the effects of a changing economic environment from the perspective of financial
stability. Chapters II to V constitute each one of these essays. Beforehand, the current
chapter provides a motivation for the work (Section 1) as well as a summarizing overview
of the papers (Section 2).
1 Motivation
Motivating research about financial stability is a “walk in the park” considering the
current market turmoil. However, by making use of the financial crisis for motivation one
risks giving the impression that only the (coincidental) occurrence of the crisis brought
about scientific thought in the field of financial stability and regulation — an otherwise
less important topic. In contrast, I argue that research in the field is of immense value
irrespective of the financial crisis. Over the past decades banking and finance has become
a major economic sector in developed industries. The fraction of GDP stemming from the
financial sector has risen by more than 15% from 1995 to 2010 in the European Union1.
The trend of a growing importance of the financial sector reaches back several decades.
While in the seventies levels of about 15% of GDP were stemming from financial activities,
1This holds for any definition of European Union, EU 15, EU 25 and EU 27. Source: Eurostat. For data
concerning the United States see Shin (2010, page 167-170).
I. 1. Motivation 12
current levels lie around 25%, with Luxembourg well above 40%.
This growing industry is highly regulated. And not without reason: The list of financial
crises, bank runs and defaults is not only a long one, these events regularly caused severe
and lasting damage in the economy as a whole. Economic theory and political reality alike
have responded, as thousands of research papers and pages of regulatory restrictions on
banks, funds and insurers testify. In a historic perspective, a long term issue in banking
regulation was avoiding sun-spot-bank-runs, as theoretically pinned down by the famous
model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). A central bank as lender of last resort together with
a deposit insurance scheme was largely seen as a the remedy to prevent runs. However, it
turned out that such an intervention causes moral hazard on the side of banks: “. . . if a
bank’s liabilities are insured at a premium that is independent of portfolio risk, then banks
hold the riskiest portfolios they are allowed to hold” (Kareken and Wallace, 1978). Again
partly due to this finding, interest in risk management techniques — the wish to accurately
quantify risk — has since then steadily increased. In the eighties the combination of finan-
cial shocks and advances in the area of risk management, most notably the propagation of
the Value-at-Risk concept, led to a response of regulators in order to tackle the problem of
moral hazard in banking described above. What followed is today labelled the Basel regime.
Despite the thick rule book banks have to follow since, the recent events in financial
markets proved to be disastrous. The cumulative dissertation at hand addresses mainly
two issues in this context:
First, similar to the introduction of a deposit insurance to tackle bank runs, capital rules in
the Basel regime might have mitigated moral hazard in the banking sector while bringing
about its own side effects, e.g., the issue of procyclicality, as argued by e.g., Kashyap and
Stein (2004). A good motivation is given by Shin (2010, page 13):
“Risk management is an essential part of the operation of a financial institution,
I. 2. Overview 13
and the value-added of a good risk management system can indeed be substan-
tial. But there may be a divergence of interests between an individual firm and
the system as a whole. Exploring exactly how the divergence of interests plays
out in the economy is an urgent modelling task for economists.”
History shows a more profound knowledge of the effects of current regulation as well as
the impact of proposed regulation as a response to crisis is of high importance.
Second, banks are still prone to failure. In order to have a better understanding of risk,
we ask how economic conditions influence the resilience of the financial sector via the
defaults of clients. We aim for a better knowledge of the macro economic factors that
drive aggregate credit risk in portfolios. Related to this question is a statistical research
question, namely what are appropriate tools to identify such linkages.
2 Overview
In this section I provide an overview of the papers that follow. It is intentionally kept
simple to be understandable to a broader audience. Advanced readers familiar with the
topics may refer to the introduction sections in the respective chapters.
The first paper is entitled “Quantifying Cyclicality of Regulatory Capital: First
Evidence From Austria” and is joint work with Michael Sigmund2. Let me briefly out-
line the background. January 2007 marked the introduction of Basel II, a new framework
of regulation for banks. For the first time, banks were allowed to calculate their regulatory
capital requirement for credit risk — a central figure in the Basler framework — according
to their internal risk models. In the prelude of the introduction of Basel II academic
debate erupted if capital requirements that are not only risk-sensitive across banks’ assets
2Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
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but also across time3 would increase capital requirements in economic downturns (for a
constant stock of assets). It was hypothesized that banks faced with (self-) increasing
capital requirements would react by reducing credit supply. Hence, it was feared that
such a regulatory regime would lead to a procyclical effect via the banks lending channel.
This question did not remain a theoretical one: With the financial crises starting in
2008 banks’ equity was severely reduced all around the globe and the question of poten-
tially cyclical capital requirements attracted attention in economic policy and public debate.
The first research paper, Chapter II, addresses this question.4 We ask if there is statistical
evidence of a comovement of economic conditions and banks’ capital requirements in
Austria. The scientific contribution of the paper consists in studying this relationship not
in a theoretical model or based on simulated data, as previous research has done, but to
use realized data. We draw on the Austrian regulatory reporting system which provides
detailed accounts of all banks operating in Austria. The advantage of using observations
rather than simulated results is that we can avoid making sensitive assumption on the risk
models in use or on the reaction of banks’ management. A further contribution consists in
the fact that we are able to distinguish between various regulatory regimes, that is Basel I
and the two approaches for credit risk in Basel II, first the use of external ratings, called
the Standardized Approach, and second the internal ratings based approach, IRB. We
set up a panel model that accounts for these conditions and include interaction terms to
measure potential cyclical variation in levels of capital requirements. Our findings show
no evidence of cyclicality under Basel I or in the Standardized Approach of Basel II but
substantial and statistically significant effects in IRB portfolios.
The second paper’s title is “Regulatory Medicine Against Financial Market Insta-
bility: What Helps And What Hurts?”. It is not co-authored. As the title suggests,
the study draws on the analogy between financial markets and organic systems. In both
3In fact this might not be limited to internal models but also to the use of external ratings from rating
agencies.
4Note that we solely focus on the question if capital requirements increase under worsening economic
conditions, not if this in turn affects the credit supply.
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cases the complex environment and the manifold interactions make it hard to predict what
consequences a particular drug or regulation will have. Therefore, without proper prior
testing, side effects and unwanted outcomes may appear. With the steep climb in the avail-
ability of computing power over the recent decades a new way of modelling such interactions
emerged: agent based models. In a nutshell, agent based models mimic the actions of
numerous agents in a computer simulation. Recent work in this field (see the references in
Chapter III) shows that these models are able to replicate stylized facts of financial markets.
In this paper we introduce leveraged agents trading a single stock according to a mispricing
signal. We find that the baseline model exhibits fat tails and clustered volatility in its time
series of returns. Subsequently, we implement three regulatory measures, a transaction
tax on trading (a “Tobin Tax”), a ban of short selling and a Value-at-Risk limit. All three
measures constitute currently discussed or already implemented regulation. However, there
is no agreement on the effects (and side effects) of the measures. Concerning the Tobin Tax
proponents argue that such a measure would drive uninformed investors out of the market,
while critics fear a drop in market liquidity would increase market volatility. Studying
the effects of a mandatory Value-at-Risk framework has a similar motivation as the first
paper. In times prices fall and risk models indicate increased variance in the returns
risk limits may force traders to sell, thus amplifying the downtrend. In our setup we are
able to identify the single effects of these measures and thus provide scientific content to
the debate. Moreover, we provide insights on the interaction of measures. The fact that
pharmaceuticals sometimes have negative or unforeseen effects when administered together
is a big issue in modern medical research. In economics, this topic has received only
little if any attention. This study therefore also investigates the joint effect of regulatory
medicine. The results identify a mandatory risk limit as the only measure surveyed that
is beneficial from every perspective. A short selling ban on the other hand — though
reducing volatility — increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for a Tobin Tax: it
reduces the occurrence of crashes but increases volatility. Furthermore, the interplay of
measures matters: measures block each other and a well-chosen combination can mitigate
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unforeseen side effects. Concerning the Tobin Tax the findings indicate that an overdose
can do severe harm.
The third paper, “What Drives Aggregate Credit Risk?”, is co-authored by Michael
Sigmund. This paper as well as the forth explore the driving macroeconomic factors of
aggregate credit risk. In other words, we want to explain the time series of firm failure
rates, which we use as a proxy for corporate defaults. Indeed, credit risk, i.e., the default
of borrowers, is the largest risk category according to the classical categorization taken in
the Basler framework. Thus, a deep understanding of its drivers is valuable for financial
institutions as well as for regulators from multiple viewpoints. For example, conducting
meaningful stress tests requires the translation of macroeconomic scenarios into portfolio
losses. The same applies when financial institutions and supervisors are interested in
forecasting the credit quality of portfolios on an aggregated level. Both in the field of macro
prudential supervision and strategic risk management a knowledge of the determinants of
aggregated defaults is crucial.
Traditional approaches to estimate aggregate credit risk (ACR) consider macroeconomic
variables as drivers. However, recent literature suggests the existence of a latent risk factor
influencing ACR, which is regularly interpreted as the latent credit cycle. In the third
paper we explicitly model this latent factor by adding an unobserved component to our
models which already include macroeconomic variables. We make use of insolvency rates
of Austria to model realized probabilities of default. To better understand sector specific
characteristics, we model six corporate industry sectors separately. The contribution of
the paper to the literature on ACR risk is threefold. First, in order to cope with the
lack of theory behind ACR drivers, i.e., to cope with model uncertainty, we implement
state-of-the-art variable selection algorithms to draw from a rich set of macroeconomic
variables. Second, we add an unobserved risk factor to a state space model which we
estimate via a Kalman filter in an expectation maximization algorithm. Third, we analyze
whether the consideration of an unobserved component indeed improves the fit of the
I. 2. Overview 17
estimated models.
Interestingly, we find that enlarging a macro-to-probability of default model by incorporat-
ing a latent risk factor only improves the model significantly if the model is allowed to select
from a small number of possible predictors. We show that this finding is not explained by
the selection procedure applied but is attributable to a limited set of variables. The limited
number of included variables also explains why some of the relevant literature finds strong
support for including unobserved risk factors in macro-to-probability of default models.
Using our enlarged dataset of macroeconomic predictors the results indicate that models
of sizes of about eight regressors are not significantly improved by the addition of a latent
factor. Moreover we find several variables which drive ACR simultaneously in a number
of sectors and are thus particularly crucial for modeling ACR. These variables include
interest rates, inflation and (negative) credit growth. However, there are also considerable
sectoral differences in the selected variables. Among the sector-specific variables we find
e.g., the oil price and exports in the transportation sector, investment in equipment in the
trade sector and short-term interest rates in the service sector.
The forth paper is entitled “Model Uncertainty and Aggregated Default Probabil-
ities: New Evidence from Austria”. It is joint work with Paul Hofmarcher and Kurt
Hornik5, Bettina Gru¨n6 and Michael Sigmund. This essay shares much of the motivation
with the third one, although we apply a more modern approach in dealing with model
uncertainty. This approach, labeled “Bayesian Model Averaging” (BMA), has only recently
gained popularity in econometric modeling. Thereby, one refrains from assuming that
there is one “true” model but instead averages over a huge number of potential models.
Sampling from the set of regressors BMA then computes several thousands of models,
which are weighted by their marginal likelihood and subsequently averaged. This simple
procedure reveals important determinants of the dependent variable and their respective
5Paul Hofmarcher and Kurt Hornik: Department of Finance, Accounting and Statistics, WU Wirtschaft-
suniversita¨t Wien, Augasse 2–6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
6Department of Applied Statistics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Altenbergerstraße 69, A-4040 Linz,
Austria.
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coefficients. In order to explicitly deal with highly correlated candidate regressors present
in our dataset, we enhance BMA with ridge regression. Our findings suggest that factor
prices like short term interest rates and energy prices constitute major drivers of default
rates, while firms’ profits reduce the expected number of failures. Finally, we show that
the results of our baseline model are fairly robust to the choice of the prior model size.
19
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Chapter II
Quantifying Cyclicality of Regulatory
Capital: First Evidence from Austria
Abstract
With the financial crisis spreading to the real economy, the discussion about potential
procyclical implications of Basel II received a surge of attention. While existing research
approaches the topic either from a theoretical perspective or from an empirical perspective
that draws on simulated data, we are first in studying the cyclicality of risk weights on
the basis of realized data. Furthermore, we are able to differentiate not only between
Basel I and Basel II, but also between the Standardized Approach (StA) and the internal
ratings-based (IRB) approach. We argue that without knowledge of these approaches’
presumably distinct cyclicality of risk weights, any measure to dampen procyclicality is
premature. For this purpose, we first study which banks opt for implementation of the IRB
approach and then set up a panel model to quantify the cyclicality of capital requirements.
While we find no evidence of cyclicality in portfolios subject to the Basel II StA, we find
economically substantial and statistically significant effects in IRB portfolios.
Keywords: Basel accord, procyclicality, business cycles.
JEL Classification: E44, G28.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
In the face of the ongoing crisis, interest in the discussion about potential procyclical
implications of the current regime of financial regulation, Basel II, has increased. In a
nutshell, it is argued that in economically bad times higher regulatory capital requirements
induce banks to reduce their lending activities, thus hampering aggregate demand (and
vice versa in good times). In the respective literature this procyclical effect is referred
to as the “bank capital channel” (see Drumond, 2008, for a synthesis). In this study
we empirically analyze the link between economic conditions and increases in regulatory
capital requirements — we refer to this link as “cyclicality of capital requirements.” At
least from an empirical point of view, potential procyclicality effects — a further economic
downturn stemming from reduced lending activities due to the cyclicality of capital
requirements — are exceptionally complex to identify. Even if one controls for all relevant
factors that affect bank lending and takes banks’ capital constraints into account, bank
lending might be procyclical even without capital requirements. So it remains unclear how
to distinguish between (additional) procyclicality induced by cyclical capital requirements
and reduced lending due to decreased demand or lending opportunities.
As Kashyap and Stein (2004) point out, capital constraints are more binding in a recession.
That is, the scarcity of bank capital relative to positive net present value lending oppor-
tunities is more severe in such an economic environment. From a bank’s perspective, two
effects lead to more binding capital constraints in times of crisis:
(i) Banks suffer losses, and these losses directly reduce equity. One can refer to this as
“contraction in the numerator,” as the capital base relative to risk-weighted assets
shrinks due to a smaller capital base.
(ii) The risk underlying banks’ assets increases; under the assumption of a regulatory
system that maps risk via an increasing function into risk weights, capital require-
ments also rise in economically difficult times. Basel II clearly aims at providing
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such a function; in fact this function constitutes the key change compared to Basel I
(Drumond 2008). One can refer to this as “expansion in the enumerator.”
To complete the picture, we add one further factor:
(iii) Capital constraints are more binding during a crisis because the possibility of raising
new capital erodes under such circumstances. Although it seems that the difficulty
of raising new capital was neglected before the crisis,1 its presence as well as its high
correlation with the two effects mentioned above are now generally acknowledged.
Many banks’ assumption of unchanged funding sources in times of crisis proved to be
terribly wrong.
To sum it up, the two effects lead to tighter capital constraints for banks and therefore to
reduced lending,2 which in turn has a negative impact on the real economy. In fact (i) is
somehow a “natural” outcome of the crisis, while (ii) is regulatorily induced. Therefore
studies on the procyclicality of regulatory system focus on the second effect.
The issue of an economic cycle-amplifying effect due to volatile capital requirements has
been much debated in financial literature. On the theoretical side, we find papers by
Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005), Heid (2007) and recently Pederzoli et al. (2010), who
model the effects of business cycle fluctuations on capital requirements. Empirical studies
on the other hand generally use data on rating migrations to simulate the effects of a
downturn on regulatory capital requirements. Among those we find e.g., the works of
Kashyap and Stein (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006) and Repullo et al. (2009) among
many others3. Although the hypothesis that Basel II induces additional cyclicality of
1E.g., Aguiar and Drumond (2007) address this effect via a varying liquidity premium on equity, Markovic
(2006) via the introduction of the adjustment cost channel, the default risk channel and the capital loss
channel. Nevertheless, the fact that the possibility to raise new capital is not included in theoretical models
has rather been seen as a drawback than a feature of the model.
2See Blum and Hellwig (1995) for a simple Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply model on how capital
requirements affect aggregate demand. Aliaga-Diaz (2005) incorporates capital requirements into a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Drumond (2008) provides an extensive literature review
of this link from a theoretical perspective. Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Jackson et al. (1999) present
empirical support.
3See Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Lowe (2002) for an overview.
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capital requirements is generally supported, a high level of uncertainty remains. There
are two main reasons for this: One is that all of the studies mentioned base their research
on simulated data rather than observed outcomes of capital requirements.4 Lowe (2002)
states that due to structural changes, the effects of Basel II cannot be assessed adequately
under the regime of Basel I, which can be seen as a version of the Lucas Critique. The
wide range of results of empirical studies reflects the sensitivity of critical assumptions
about the construction of simulated data. Reviewing the literature on this topic, one finds
differing assumptions about management reactions, rating migration, rerating frequency,
severeness of the downturn, etc.
The second reason for the high level of uncertainty is that there is very little or no evidence
on how the cyclicality of capital requirements differs between regulatory regimes, i.e.,
Basel I, Basel II StA and Basel II IRB.5 In fact, many empirical studies focus solely on
IRB and therefore do not allow a comparison. While it seems obvious that Basel II takes
more sensitive risk weights into account than Basel I, irrespective of the approach, the
comparison of StA and IRB is not clear from an ex ante perspective. Furthermore, we
argue that without knowledge of these approaches’ presumably distinct cyclicality, any
measure to dampen procyclicality suggested by the literature is premature.
The contribution of our study is therefore twofold. First, we examine the cyclicality of
capital requirements based on realized, not simulated data. Our observation period covers
an entire business cycle from the year 2000 to 2009, thus including the recent crisis.
Second, we provide first evidence on the question so far unanswered in existing literature
of whether risk weights show more cyclicality under the StA or under IRB. To measure
the extent to which Basel II contributes to cyclicality, we set up a panel model. The
regulatory reporting system, which provides us with detailed and frequent information on
4This is because most studies were conducted prior to or at an early stage of implementation of Basel II.
However, there is research studying the determinants of capital ratios subject to Basel I that makes use of
realized data. See Francis and Osborne (2009) and the references therein.
5See www.oenb.at/en/presse_pub/period_pub/baselII/basel_ii.jsp for a comprehensive overview of
Basel II, including a detailed description of the differences between Basel II StA and Basel II IRB.
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the Austrian banking sector, serves as a data source. Drawing on this source, we hope to
find answers to the question of how capital requirements evolve in crisis periods, and to
differentiate between Basel I, Basel II StA and Basel II IRB.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines IRB more closely,
focusing on banks’ and regulators’ motivation for introducing this regulatory approach.
Section 3 presents the modeling approach to quantify cyclical effects, whose results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with an outlook on how the cyclicality of capital
requirements can be embedded in the economic and political discussion about procyclicality.
In particular, we highlight some areas of future research.
2 IRB Implementation
In this section we give a brief overview of IRB to better understand its role in the cyclical
behavior of regulatory capital requirements and to address the question of which banks
are able and willing to switch to IRB.
From a bank’s perspective, the benefit of an IRB approach lies mainly in reduced capital
requirements, as intended by the BIS.6 Furthermore, the possibility of calculating own
risk weights for certain bank assets without relying on the fixed Basel II tabularized
weights can be seen as a major incentive. Banks subject to IRB are required to estimate
their risk parameters based on a time series of at least five years. However, under certain
circumstances, this time period may temporarily be reduced to two years.7 In any case,
this time span allows probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) estimations
to be conducted over the horizon of an economic boom phase during which estimates may
be favorable with regard to minimizing risk weights.
6Compare the Quantitative Impact Studies (Bank for International Settlements 2006).
7See EU Directive 2006/48 Annex VII Part 4, 66 and 71.
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On the cost side, the design and implementation of an IRB approach requires a certain
amount of resources and know-how that only larger banks are likely to have at their
disposal. Moreover, to counteract any incentives for banks to minimize their risk–weighted
assets excessively, banks are only allowed to implement a certified model subject to
regulatory supervision. From the regulator’s view, the reduced capital requirements are
compensated for by a higher risk sensitivity, leading to more sophisticated coverage and a
deeper awareness of the risks a bank is exposed to.
To econometrically analyze the decision-making process, we conduct a series of probit
regressions that try to incorporate the above arguments. A few theoretical papers (i.e.,
Ruthenberg and Landskroner 2008 and Hakenes and Schnabel 2006) use bank size as a
proxy for the ability to carry out large initial investments in risk management technologies
that are necessary to comply with the regulatory requirements for such models. Aside
from bank size (measured in total assets), variables that indicate the portfolio composition
are used as explanatory variables.
In our models we find that bank size has a significant positive effect on the probability of
adopting the IRB approach. On the benefits side, we could not clearly identify significant
variables related to portfolio structure and quality. However, we believe that these incon-
clusive results are possibly related to the fact that IRB banks have not yet implemented
the IRB for their entire portfolio.
3 Model Specification and Data
Following the argumentation of the previous section, we now turn to the modeling of the
panel model to assess cyclical capital requirements8 in banks. The capital requirement of
bank i at time t, CRi,t, can be expressed as
8For the remainder of the work “capital requirements” will exclusively refer to regulatory capital require-
ments of credit risk.
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CRi,t = f

rri,t,
eet,
bank sizei,t,
other factorsi,t

. (1)
Under rri,t,“regulatory regime”, we identify whether bank i is subject to Basel I or Basel II,
uses the IRB approach to determine its regulatory capital requirement, etc., at time t, while
under the term eet, “economic environment”, we identify general financial or macroeco-
nomic conditions at time t. As the latter are assumed to be identical for all banks at a
given time t, there is no subscript i. In this study the focus lies on
E
(
∂CRi,t
∂eet
∣∣∣∣ rri,t = X) . (2)
E denotes the mathematical expectation parameter. Clearly, the hypothesis is that the re-
lation between capital requirements and economic environment is subject to the regulatory
regime a bank has to follow.
3.1 Data Description
In order to determine the dependence of capital requirements on economic conditions,
we set up a panel model. In the next step, we present the data input needed to model
Function (1). We use quarterly data from all banks active in the Austrian market between
March 2000 and March 2009. To the authors’ knowledge, so far there has been no attempt
to answer the discussed questions with a dataset of comparable size. The number of data
points available totals 26,604.9 The bulk of the data stems from the Austrian reporting
system which obliges banks to regularly provide certain data, especially solvency related
data. Consequently, information on banks’ regulatory capital requirements (CR) and on
their respective regulatory regime are available on a monthly basis. Clearly, CR is the
dependent variable, while we use data on the regulatory regime to construct (i) a dummy
9This is less than 850 banks times 4 quarters times 9 years (i.e., 30,600), as not every banks reports
non-zero numbers for the whole period. In such cases the respective data points have been eliminated.
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variable equal to one if the bank reports under the Basel II regulation,10 and (ii) a variable
which measures the share of the risk-weighted assets a banks calculates using the IRB
approach.11 These time series will be denoted B2Di,t and IRBi,t for the remainder of the
study.
A priori, many variables would be suited to quantifying economic conditions, e.g., gross
domestic product, unemployment, credit spreads, asset price indices, interest rates, to
name just a few. Fortunately, we can draw on intensive literature concerning this selection
process in Austria. Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) and Boss (2002) study the influence
of several macroeconomic factors on provisions for credit losses or respectively on the
probability of default in the Austrian financial sector. Reviewing these studies, certain
factors are found to have a high explanatory power of the relevant exogenous variable in
both studies.12 Among these are asset price indices, exports, GDP, nominal short-term
interest rates and industrial production.
Following these findings, we use Austrian real exports and Austrian real GDP to summarize
economic conditions.13 Thus, EEt refers to either exports or GDP. With respect to bank
size, we use total assets, denoted TAi,t.
3.2 Estimation
Having presented the data, we now turn to details of the model specification. As changes
in economic conditions or in the size of a bank obviously affect its capital requirements
in relative terms, the variables enter the model in logarithms. Furthermore, in order to
capture ∂CRi,t/∂eet conditional on the regulatory regime (see Equation (2)) dependences
are modeled by including interaction terms.
10This is the case for no bank before January 2007 and for all banks after January 2008.
11Therefore IRB equals zero for all banks not making use of the IRB approach.
12In the case of Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) it is the sum of write-offs and in the case of Boss (2002)
sector wide average PDs.
13We also calculate respective estimations for nominal terms.
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Hence, Equation (1) is modeled via
logCRi,t = α0i + α1 log TAi,t + α2B2Di,t + α3 IRBi,t +
p∑
j=0
βj logEEt−j +
p∑
j=0
γj (logEEt−j ×B2Di,t) +
p∑
j=0
ηj (logEEt−j × IRBi,t) + ui,t
(3)
As already stated, TAi,t denotes total assets and is therefore a measure of the size of the
bank, B2Di,t a dummy variable indicating the switch to Basel II, IRBi,t the share of risk
weighted assets calculated by IRB and EEt either real GDP or real exports. ui,t is the
usual error term, thus including “other factors”. We include lags up to two, p := 2, in
order to additionally incorporate the dependence on lagged explanatory variables.
Problematically, Equation (3) contains two issues that must be dealt with when estimated.
First, individual time constant effects, α0i, are unobserved and estimating them would
lead to a severe reduction in degrees of freedom. Second, several variables in Equation (3)
are candidates for containing unit roots, which would render an estimation inconsistent.
To closer examine the matter, we apply the panel unit root test suggested by Hanck14 and
find strong evidence for unit roots especially in the time series CR and TA, as well as in
the time series for economic environment.
However, both issues can easily be dealt with by first differencing over time. This yields
∆ logCRi,t = α1 ∆ log TAi,t + α2 ∆B2Di,t + α3 ∆IRBi,t +
p∑
j=0
βj ∆ logEEt−j +
p∑
j=0
γj (∆ logEEt−j ×B2Di,t) +
p∑
j=0
ηj (∆ logEEt−j × IRBi,t) + ∆ui,t.
(4)
Note that the individual time-constant effects have disappeared. Furthermore, we find
no evidence of unit roots in the differenced time series. In our case, first differencing has
additional appeal compared to fixed-effects or random effects estimation. Applying a test
14This panel test is based on the Simes’ multiple test. See Hanck (2009) for details.
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suggested by Wooldridge (2002, see section 10.6.3), we cannot reject the hypothesis of
serial correlated errors in the model specified in levels, but find strong evidence against
serial correlated errors in differences.
The parameters βj ’s measure the influence of the economic environment on capital
requirements under Basel I. Under this regime, there was little or no risk sensitivity.
Therefore, we expect these parameters to be indistinguishable from zero. In the subsequent
sections the parameters of highest interest will be γj ’s and ηj ’s, as they measure the
procyclicality of capital requirements under Basel II and IRB, respectively. A negative sign
of these parameters would mean that in times of deteriorating economic conditions, capital
requirements increase (on average) while the opposite would hold true for an upswing.
As the main distinctive criterion between Basel I and its successor Basel II is that the
latter aims at increasing the sensitivity of capital requirements to the risk of banks’ assets
(Drumond 2008), one could expect the long-run propensity of additional cyclicality of
Basel II StA, γ¯ :=
∑p
j=0 γj , to be negative. This would indicate a more pronounced
cyclical movement of capital requirements than under Basel I. However, as already stated,
most literature on procyclicality focuses on IRB, not on the StA. In fact, the StA assigns
risk weights to all instruments that carry credit risk. These risk weights are either fixed (if
no external rating exists) or subject to a mapping process of international rating agencies,
which, according to Cantor (2004) run through the cycle (TTC) models.15
Consulting existing literature on that matter, we find mixed results. Amato and Furfine
(2003) and Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005) find little or no cyclicality in TTC models,
while Bangia et al. (2002) using migration matrices of Standard & Poors find substantial
dependence of rating migrations on the business cycle. As a consequence of the mixed
results, it is not clear ex ante whether the long-run propensity of Basel II StA is in
fact negative. Likewise, the question concerning the long-run propensity of Basel II
15As discussed in Cantor and Mann (2003) and Fons (2002), agency ratings are stable because they are
intended to measure the default risk over long investment horizons.
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IRB, η¯ :=
∑p
j=0 ηj , is far from clear-cut. Although the simulation studies of Gordy and
Howells (2006) and Kashyap and Stein (2004) indicate a pronounced movement of capital
requirements under IRB, reality could still show distinct behavior due to management
actions, rating model specifications, etc. As a matter of fact, using IRB offers more
flexibility in calculating risk weights and therefore the possibility to avoid increasing
capital requirements. Furthermore, IRB models are also generally allowed to be TTC.16
Therefore, we must conclude that ex ante there is again no agreed opinion whether the
long-run propensity of IRB will in fact be negative, indicating additional cyclicality of IRB
compared to StA and Basel I.
Estimating Equation (4) provides us with the parameters γj and ηj , which may be used for
calculating the long-run propensities of interest, γ¯ and η¯, as they are defined as the sum
of the individual parameters. However, Equation (4) does not provide us with estimates of
their uncertainty, i.e., their standard errors, as the long-run propensities are not directly
estimated. Therefore, we rewrite the model specified in Equation (4) using the definitions
of γ¯ and η¯ from above and adding β¯ :=
∑p
j=0 βj to get
∆ logCRi,t = α1 ∆ log TAi,t + α2 ∆B2Di,t + α3 ∆IRBi,t+
β¯∆ logEEt +
p∑
j=1
βj (∆ logEEt−j −∆ logEEt) +
γ¯ (∆ logEEt ×B2Di,t) +
p∑
j=1
γj (∆ logEEt−j ×B2Di,t − ∆ logEEt ×B2Di,t) +
η¯ (∆ logEEt × IRBi,t) +
p∑
j=1
ηj (∆ logEEt−j × IRBi,t − ∆ logEEt × IRBi,t) + ∆ui,t
(5)
This way, we can calculate usual standard errors of the long-run propensities, as they are
directly estimated.
16As the IRB banks in our sample do not differ in the degree of through the cycle vs point in time, we can
not make a distinction here. Generally, the models are said to be neither clear TTC nor PIT, but rather a
mixed approach.
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4 Results
In this section we turn to the results of the estimation of Equation (5). We present the
estimates in Table II.A and II.B with White’s robust estimates of standard errors and
respective p-values. Table II.A shows the outcome using real exports to indicate economic
environment while Table II.B uses real GDP. The corresponding tables for nominal exports
and GDP can be found in the Appendix.
The main focus of our interest lies in the parameter β¯, γ¯ and η¯ representing the cyclical
effects of Basel I, Basel II StA and IRB. A negative sign of these coefficients indicates
cyclicality, meaning that once economic conditions worsen and exports or GDP move
down, capital requirements go up and vice versa. Hence, the estimates of parameter β¯
indicate that there was no cyclicality under Basel I. This result is in line with expectations
(see Section 3 for a discussion thereof), as Basel I had no integrated risk sensitivity. The
fact that the coefficient has a positive sign may stem from banks’ investing in riskier
customer segments in good times. However, considering the small size of the estimate of
β¯, the economic importance of this effect is rather low.
More surprisingly, we find no evidence of cyclicality under Basel II StA either. Depending
on the specification of the model, we find either a negative or a positive sign of the
estimate of γ¯. Moreover, the estimate is not significant regardless of the way in which
current economic conditions are modeled. In accordance with these findings we conclude
that under Basel II StA there seem to be only little or no cyclical effects.
Interestingly, the case of IRB is much different. The cyclicality of capital requirements
under IRB measured by η¯ is large and statistically different from zero under usual
significance levels. This finding is in line with prior empirical research as in Kashyap
and Stein (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006) and Repullo et al. (2009). The estimated
parameter of around -1.5 indicates that a fall of exports or GDP of one percent translates
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coefficients estimates std. error p-values
Basic Effects
α1 Elasticity of Total Assets 0.749280 0.051782 0.000000
α2 Elasticity of Basel II Introduction -0.122964 0.013648 0.000000
α3 Effect of IRB Implementation -0.209455 0.210095 0.318797
Long Run Business Cycle Elasticities:
β¯ underlying - Basel I 0.052185 0.015655 0.000859
γ¯ (additional) of Basel II -0.024417 0.157141 0.876522
η¯ (additional) of IRB -1.669019 0.279067 0.000000
Table II.A: Estimation results using real exports to indicate current economic environment.
on average in an 1.5% increase in regulatory capital requirements of IRB portfolios.
The reported parameters of introduction of Basel II and IRB, α2 and α3, as well as the
elasticity of total assets, α1, are as expected. The introduction of Basel II and IRB lower
regulatory capital requirements of credit risk, while total assets clearly have an increasing
effect.
The inclusion of GDP or exports to represent current economic conditions shows (see Ta-
ble II.A and II.B) that most parameters are robust to this question. Additionally, regarding
the use of nominal terms instead of real terms (see Table II.C and II.D) we find that the
estimates are in line with the one derived using real variables.
5 Conclusions
Building on these results, we conclude that cyclicality of capital requirements is a major
issue for IRB banks but appears to be less important for StA banks. However, one should
bear in mind that the cyclical behavior of capital requirements — as analyzed in this study
— is after management action. Therefore, possible cyclical movement of capital require-
ments under Basel II StA might trigger counter measures on the side of the management
that might not show up in the regression.
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coefficients estimates std. error p-values
Basic Effects
α1 Elasticity of Total Assets 0.751603 0.050840 0.000000
α2 Elasticity of Basel II Introduction -0.136265 0.011876 0.000000
α3 Effect of IRB Implementation -0.275248 0.203722 0.176676
Long Run Business Cycle Elasticities:
β¯ underlying - Basel I 0.020535 0.005983 0.000599
γ¯ (additional) of Basel II 0.121632 0.103403 0.239490
η¯ (additional) of IRB -1.572507 0.197363 0.000000
Table II.B: Estimation results using real GDP to indicate current economic environment.
As the cyclicality of capital requirements is the basis for potential procyclicality, it is im-
portant to distinguish between IRB and StA in policy analysis. Numerous suggestions for
adequate measures to address procyclicality have been made in the respective literature
(see Drumond (2008) section 4.3 for an overview). Although the discussion of these pro-
posals would go beyond the scope of this text, our empirical study provides a quantitative
foundation for the ongoing discussion. For the next step in the procyclicality discussion,
further research on the empirical influence of cyclicality requirements on future lending
activities and economic growth is necessary.
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Appendix A
coefficients estimates std. error p-values
Basic Effects
α1 Elasticity of Total Assets 0.748007 0.051674 0.000000
α2 Elasticity of Basel II Introduction -0.130055 0.012441 0.000000
α3 Effect of IRB Implementation -0.230273 0.207561 0.267259
Long Run Business Cycle Elasticities:
β¯ underlying - Basel I 0.170104 0.045620 0.000193
γ¯ (additional) of Basel II 0.166658 0.271407 0.539185
η¯ (additional) of IRB -2.591295 0.395711 0.000000
Table II.C: Estimation results using nominal exports to indicate current economic environ-
ment.
coefficients estimates std. error p-values
Basic Effects
α1 Elasticity of Total Assets 0.749526 0.051911 0.000000
α2 Elasticity of Basel II Introduction -0.122294 0.013137 0.000000
α3 Effect of IRB Implementation -0.220497 0.211959 0.298220
Long Run Business Cycle Elasticities:
β¯ underlying - Basel I 0.050780 0.018181 0.005226
γ¯ (additional) of Basel II -0.037176 0.069250 0.591381
η¯ (additional) of IRB -2.369288 0.321060 0.000000
Table II.D: Estimation results using nominal GDP to indicate current economic environment.
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Chapter III
Regulatory Medicine Against Financial
Market Instability: What Helps And
What Hurts?
Abstract
Do we know if a short selling ban or a Tobin Tax results in more stable asset prices? Or
do they in fact make things worse? Just like medicine regulatory measures in financial
markets aim at improving an already complex system, cause side effects and interplay with
other measures. In this paper an agent based stock market model is built that tries to find
answers to the questions above. In a stepwise procedure regulatory measures are intro-
duced and their implications on market liquidity and stability examined. Particularly, the
effects of (i) a ban on short selling (ii) a mandatory risk limit, i.e., a Value-at-Risk limit,
(iii) an introduction of a Tobin Tax, i.e., a transaction tax on trading, and (iv) any
arbitrary combination of the measures are observed and discussed. The model is set up
to incorporate non-linear feedback effects of leverage and liquidity constraints leading to
fire sales. In its unregulated version the model outcome is capable of reproducing stylized
facts of asset returns like fat tails and clustered volatility. Introducing regulatory measures
shows that only a mandatory risk limit is beneficial from every perspective, while a short
selling ban — though reducing volatility — increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for
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a Tobin Tax: it reduces the occurrence of crashes but increases volatility. Furthermore,
the interplay of measures is not negligible: measures block each other and a well-chosen
combination can mitigate unforeseen side effects. Concerning the Tobin Tax the findings
indicate that an overdose can do severe harm.
Keywords: Tobin Tax, transaction tax, short selling ban, Value-at-Risk limits, risk
management herding, agent based models.
JEL Classification: E37, G01, G12, G14, G18.
1 Motivation
“It’s remarkable that while any new technical device or medical drug has ex-
tensive testing for efficiency, reliability and safety before it ever hits the market,
we still implement new economic measures without any prior testing.”
— Dirk Helbing, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich in Buchanan
(2009).
The financial crisis spurred the discussion about further regulations in asset markets.
However, the consequences of imposing a transaction tax, a short selling ban or mandatory
risk limits are unknown to a large extent. “Prior testing” is both: hardly feasible and
absolutely necessary. Hardly feasible, because the large sums of money handled, the
interconnectedness of actions etc. do not allow for lab experiments. Only within newly
emerged agent based models this task seems doable. At the same time, prior testing is
absolutely necessary. Like the human body the financial market is an enormously complex
organism and like medicine regulatory measures aim at improving it. Side effects or
unforeseen interactions of measures require prior testing, as the quotation above demands.
This paper provides evidence if indeed imposing regulatory measures makes markets more
stable. To do so, an agent based model framework is set up, which shares basic ideas of
Thurner et al. (2009). Subsequently, this baseline model is modified by the introduction
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of regulatory measures.
Why Agent Based Models?
The dynamics of financial markets pose a challenge to research just as they pose a threat
to financial stability. Typically, asset returns are characterized by so called stylized facts
including fat tails and clustered volatility (see Cont 2001). Classic economic theory fails
to predict such behavior. Recent literature, however, has shown that by the incorporation
of leverage, fire sales, escape dynamics and liquidity constraints stylized facts occur
(Friedman and Abraham 2009). The financial crisis confirmed the importance of taking
such effects into account. However, modeling interaction effects in an analytical framework
soon becomes intractable. Therefore, the dramatic increase of computational power over
the past decades gave rise to agent based models. Within such models one is allowed to
move away from the classical modeling approach featuring the representative agent but
to model the action of each and every actor, thus integrating non-linear feedback dynamics.1
While typical agent based models feature heterogeneous agents who dynamically optimize
seemingly irrational strategies2, Thurner et al. (2009) recently showed that even under the
assumption of relatively rational value-investors fat tails occur when feedback effects of
leverage are incorporated. The baseline model introduced in Section 2 draws on Thurner
et al. (2009). It models leveraged agents who trade a single asset according to a mispric-
ing signal. In its unregulated version the model reproduces fat tails and clustered volatility.
Regulatory Measures
The focus is then shifted to the question of interest, the impact of regulatory measures.
The financial crisis has amplified voices demanding a stronger regulatory framework of asset
markets. Among the cloud of demands the following are picked for closer examination:
1Numerous papers give witness to the popularity agent based models gained over the past two decades,
see LeBaron (2001) and LeBaron (2006) for extended literature discussions.
2Compare for instance trend followers in models of Lux (1998) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) or
the Minority Game literature, e.g., Challet et al. (2001) and Satinover and Sornette (2007).
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(i) a ban of short selling,
(ii) a mandatory risk limit and
(iii) a Tobin Tax, i.e., transaction tax on trading3.
In each of the three cases a high level of uncertainty concerning the consequences of an
introduction prevents a fact-led discussion. This is probably best seen by reading the
following two citations of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher
Cox. The first quote was made at the time of introduction of the short selling ban in
US-stock markets in September 2008 (New York Times 2008) and the second only three
months later in December 2008 (Reuters 2008):
“The emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will
restore equilibrium to markets.”
“While the actual effects of this temporary action will not be fully understood
for many more months, if not years, knowing what we know now, I believe
on balance the commission would not do it again. . . . The costs appear to
outweigh the benefits.”
In their empirical study Marsh and Niemer (2008) find “no strong evidence that (short
selling bans) have been effective in reducing share price volatility or limiting share price
falls.” Further studies based on observed data (e.g., Lobanova et al. 2010, Boehmer et al.
2009 and Beber and Pagano 2009) find rather negative effects of short selling restrictions
on market liquidity and increasing effects on volatility.
Similarly, the adoption of a Tobin Tax, i.e., transaction tax on trading, has led to
controversy within the field of academics as well as within politics. Originally proposed by
Tobin (1978), the tax now enjoys great popularity as a potential means to reduce market
3While the Tobin Tax was originally suggested only for foreign exchange rate markets, the term is now
regularly applied to mean a tax on financial transactions in general. This paper uses the terms transaction
tax and Tobin Tax synonymously.
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volatility and as source for tax revenues. In fact, merely naming supporters and opposers
of the tax would be way out of the scope of this paper. However, a clear reflection of
the popularity can be grasped by the length of the respective article in Wikipedia (2010),
which also provides a comprehensive list of the numerous supporters and opposers in
politics. In the academic world, studies come to mixed conclusions. While a negative effect
on trading volume is generally agreed upon, the impact on price volatility is less clear cut
and even contrary, leading Hanke et al. (2010) to infer that “in sum, the literature on the
effects of a Tobin tax on market efficiency arrives at opposite ends. . . . there is no general
agreement on the consequences of a Tobin tax on price volatility.” While some argue that
a transaction tax reduces the trading of rather uninformed actors, thus leading to more
efficient and less volatile markets, others argue that a transaction tax prevents flexible
price adjustment to new information and therefore rather leads to price jumps and higher
volatility (see also the debate in Hanke et al. 2010). Westerhoff (2003), Ehrenstein et al.
(2005), Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) and Mannaro et al. (2008) study the imposition of
a transaction tax within the framework of agent based models. While the latter conclude
that volatility rises with the imposition of a Tobin Tax, the other papers find that the
effects depend on the liquidity of a market and on the magnitude of the tax.
The third regulatory measure, titled mandatory risk limits, may seem less debated,
but is in fact already in place for many of the larger market participants like banks
via the Basel regime. In such a regime, agents are obliged to quantify their risk and
relate this risk to their own funds, thus keeping their theoretical default probability
below a certain threshold. Insurers and hedge funds are as well required to run risk
managements techniques – a regulation that is currently intensified. Irrespective of
the regulatory framework, risk quantification and risk limiting has become a general
practice among the major market participants, i.e., funds and banks (see e.g., chapter
1.1 in McNeil et al. 2005). While a sound risk management is without doubt for the
benefit of the single institution, its consequences for systemic risks are ambiguous. To see
this, imagine an agent close to its risk limit when stocks decline. The decline not only
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shrinks her own funds but may also increase the risk quantified for the same position.
This may in turn lead to fire sales, thus amplifying the initial shock. Such phenom-
ena combined with strategy herding could potentially lead to severe downturn momentum.4
This paper not only discusses the implications of the three regulatory measures, but
further provides evidence on their potential interplay. While the interplay of drugs and
their side effects is a pervasive topic in medical research, it is much less debated in the
context of financial markets. Thus, this paper aims at giving answers to the interplay of
the regulatory measures.
To conclude, the contribution of the paper is threefold. Firstly, while the effects of a
short selling ban and of a transaction tax have already been studied, there remains a level
of uncertainty that requires further research. Furthermore, the effects of risk limits —
though beneficial on the individual level — may have negative side effects, which seem to
have been neglected in the scientific discussion. Secondly, existing literature approaches
the questions usually either from an empirical view using observed data or a reduced form
theoretical model, but not within the framework of an agent based model5. Thirdly, to
the author’s knowledge this paper is first in examining the combination of these regulatory
measures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline
model with no regulations in place. Subsequently, Section 3 presents adjustments due to
the regulatory measures. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results and outlines potential
shortcomings of the approach, thus suggesting ways of further research, while Section 5
concludes.
4Strategy herding is in fact a major driver for market crashes in agent based Minority Games. See e.g.,
the work of Satinover and Sornette (2007).
5Note the exceptions concerning the Tobin Tax: Westerhoff (2003), Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Pellizzari
and Westerhoff (2009) and Mannaro et al. (2008).
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2 The Baseline Model
This section describes the baseline model representing the unrestricted market. The
description starts at the most general level and successively works downwards explaining
the model in more detail.
At the top level there is the market clearing equation defining that at each timestep t total
demand, as sum over the Na individual demands Di,t, must equal the total number of
shares N s, therefore ensuring that supply meets demand and the market clears.
Na∑
i=1
Di,t(pt) = N
s (1)
As described below, demand of each single agent is a function of price pt among others. By
solving Equation (1) one obtains the price.6 At each timestep agents choose the fraction
of their total wealth Wi,t to be invested in cash Ci,t and in shares, therefore
Wi,t = Ci,t + ptDi,t(pt). (2)
Before turning to the demand equations, note that when Di,t < 0 agents take a short
position and when Di,t > 0 they are long. To fund their actions agents can leverage
themselves up to a maximum leverage of λmax.7 As long as leverage is not at its maximum,
agents’ demand is a linear function of the perceived mispricing signal. This mispricing
signal is the difference between the current price and the perceived fundamental value, thus
mi,t := p
perc
i,t − pt. This leads to the demand functions:
6This set–up is more sophisticated than the one used by usual agent based models, in which price is a
(linear) function of “excess demand”, which implies a linear response to market movements (e.g., Friedman
and Abraham 2009). It comes, however, at the cost of more complex computational demands.
7According to modern standard, leverage is defined as the asset side (of the balance sheet) divided by
own funds, therefore λlongi,t := ptDi,t(pt)/Wi,t and λ
short
i,t := (Wi,t − ptDi,t(pt))/Wi,t.
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Di,t =

(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(3)
where βi represents a parameter denoting the aggressiveness of the agent, that is how
fast he reacts to price signals and mcriti,t the mispricing signal which would lead to
the use of the maximum leverage. Thus, mcrit,shorti,t = (1 − λmax)/βi if agent i is in
a short position and mcrit,longi,t = λ
max/βi if she is long. While the first two lines of
Equation (3) simply limit the demand to its maximum leverage, the third specifies
demand in the unbounded case as a linear function of the mispricing signal and the
aggressiveness of the agent, βi.
8 Price and wealth in Equation (3) ensures that at a given
mispricing signal two equally aggressive agents will invest the same fraction of their wealth.9
Until now, the perceived fundamental value of the share, pperci,t , was left unspecified. In this
model, agents’ perceptions follows a discrete Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that guarantees
the perceived values to wander around but mean revert to the fundamental value.
log pperci,t = ρ log p
perc
i,t−1 + (1− ρ) log V + i,t, (4)
where V denotes the true fundamental value,  ∼ N(0,Σ) and 0 < ρ < 1. In order to
mirror market wide misjudgment and herding  correlates across agents. Finally, in each
round t before each market participant i computes his demand according to Equation (3)
and the price pt is derived according Equation (1)
10 the wealth Wi,t is updated according
to
Wi,t = Wi,t−1 +Di,t−1 (pt − pt−1). (5)
8In fact, the underlying utility function would be (subscripts omitted): U(D,C) = Dβm C1−β . See also
Thurner et al. (2009).
9As in practice only a fraction of agents actually take short positions, for simulation purpose define τ as
the fraction of agents who avoid taking short positions even in the baseline model.
10Note that Equation (3) and Equation (1) have to be solved simultaneously as both depend on the other.
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In line with Thurner et al. (2009), agents default if their wealth, Wi,t, decreases below
10% of their initial wealth and are reintroduced after 100 timesteps. This fact is primarily
necessary in order to avoid having agents with diminishingly little wealth — and therefore
no relevance — in the market. In reality, agents’ defaults would impact other agents if their
holdings would not be pure assets but bets on the long or short side. The consideration
of this mechanic in the model would, however, require a matching algorithm between
agents as well as an algorithm to determine if the defaulting agent holds pure assets or
derivatives. Both requirements would increase model complexity even more. Additionally,
the size of the effect can be considered as small, as the results (see Section 4) show only
a limited number of defaults (i.e., wealth sinks below 10% of initial wealth) and even a
smaller number of negative wealth. Consequently, we assume for simplicity that agents’
defaults do not impact other agents.
With the model specifications outlined, we are ready to run the model in its unregulated
version. Figure III.a displays the implied characteristics of the returns calibrated according
to Table III.C (see the Appendix, page 61). While plot a and b display excess kurtosis
present in the implied time series of returns as well as a gain/loss asymmetry, plot c
and d provide evidence on the absence of autocorrelation among returns but non-zero
autocorrelation among squared returns, i.e., clustered volatility is present (see Cont
2001). The emergence of these characteristics is endogenous considering the normal iid
distribution of ~t in Equation (4).
So, the patient shows symptoms, but which medicine help?
3 Short selling ban, risk limits and transaction tax
Having specified the unregulated model, this section presents the amendments for each
regulatory measure in sequence.
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Figure III.a: Statistical Properties of Returns: (a) display of kernel density estimates of the
returns compared to the normal distribution with respective standard deviation, (b) Q-Q plot
of returns against normal and student t distributions with 7 df, (c) plot of a typical draw
of returns, (d) autocorrelation function for returns and squared returns with 95% confidence
intervals.
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Short selling ban
In the unregulated market, agents’ demand of shares can be positive or negative alike.
In the latter case, the agent goes short. To implement a short selling ban the demand
Equation (3) has to be adjusted to cap the demand at zero.
Di,t =

0 if mi,t ≤ 0
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise.
(6)
Note that in comparison to Equation (3) only the first line changed.
Value-at-Risk limits
As discussed in the introduction, Value-at-Risk is now a widely applied concept in risk
management. Hereby, one quantifies the risk of a given position according to a quantile of
the estimated loss distribution. While different methods are applied in practice, this paper
sticks to the popular and straight forward variant called variance-covariance approach.
Hence, in a first step market participants calculate their individual Value-at-Risk for holding
one unit of the asset at each timestep:
VaRi,t = µi,t − α ∗ σi,t, (7)
where µi,t and σi,t are empirical estimates of mean and standard deviation of asset returns.
More precisely, agents compute µi,t and σi,t out of past observations of the (endogenous)
time series of returns. Note the agent specific subscript indicating that agents use different
look-back periods for calculations (see the Appendix, page 61, for details on the calibra-
tion). Furthermore, in line with the assumptions of the variance-covariance approach
α = Φ−1(0.99) represents the 99%-quantile of the normal distribution in Equation (7).
In a second step, the VaR determined by Equation (7) feeds into the demand function.
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To adjust the demand equation of the baseline model, define mcrit,vari,t := (βi VaRi,t)
−1 as
the critical mispricing signal, at which the unbounded demand would be higher than the
maximum Value-at-Risk.11 Consequently, Equation (3) changes to
Di,t =

(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
−Wi,t/(pt VaRi,t) if mi,t < −mcrit,vari,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
Wi,t/(pt VaRi,t) if mi,t > m
crit,var
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(8)
while in case more than one restriction hits, the one that satisfies min(|Di,t|) is in effect.
Comparing the baseline model of Equation (3) with Equation (8) above one finds that
simply two new lines have emerged holding the implied risk in check. Thus, agents
subjected to a Value-at-Risk limit are not only bound by the maximum leverage constraint
but by a maximum portfolio Value-at-Risk as well, which aims at reducing the default
probability of agents below a certain threshold. Consequently, it may be that agents have
to unwind part of their position, i.e., decrease their demand from t to t + 1, solely due to
an increase in the estimated volatility, σi,t.
The simultaneous reign of a short selling ban and a Value-at-Risk limit would bind the
demand to zero if mi,t ≤ 0, while the remainder of Equation (8) would hold.
Transaction Tax
In its core, a transaction tax reduces the expected return of an investment by (twice)12 the
tax level applied. Agents will therefore require a higher expected payoff for the same level
of investment, i.e., their demand in the asset. Reviewing the unrestricted model yields that
11The deviation is simple, considering that the Value-at-Risk concept limits the portfolio VaR, Di,t · pt ·
VaRi,t, to equal Wi,t at maximum.
12The tax is applied at buying and selling the asset.
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the average realized pay-off of an investment is a positive function of the absolute value
of the mispricing signal. Clearly, the larger the mispricing signal, the higher the certainty
that the asset is over- or underpriced. Consequently, in a Tobin Tax environment agents
will keep their current demand unchanged, if they are subjected to only a minor mispricing
signal, or in other words they will only change their demand if the mispricing signal is
strong enough, so that expected pay-offs of the trade are positive. Hence, under the regime
of a transaction tax, agents compute their demand according to
Di,t =

Di,t−1 if |D∗i,t −Di,t−1| < Γ
(1− λmax)Wi,t/pt if mi,t < mcrit,shorti,t
λmaxWi,t/pt if mi,t > m
crit,long
i,t
βimi,tWi,t/pt otherwise,
(9)
where Γ is a threshold for the mispricing signal, and D∗i,t is the demand that would result
without incorporation of the Tobin Tax, i.e., without the first line of Equation (9). Note
that only this first line is new and in case more than one restriction hits, the one that
satisfies min(|Di,t|) is in effect. This ensures that changes in demand due to shifts in
the mispricing signal, mi,t, require a defined magnitude. In the simulation the thresh-
old is chosen in order to keep (empirically determined) expected returns of trading positive.
Combination of Regulatory Measures
For any arbitrary combination of the three regulatory measures one has to merge the
formulas from above. As in each case restrictions are added to the original demand, merging
them is straight forward. For instance, under a short selling ban and a Value-at-Risk limit
demand is limited to zero or positive values, while at the upper bound the leverage and
Value-at-Risk limit bind demand against becoming excessive. As the final set of equation
for each combination of regulatory measures is somewhat lengthy, their display is omitted
here.
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4 Results
This section turns now to the simulated impacts of the regulatory measures on (i) mar-
ket liquidity, (ii) market volatility, (iii) market stability, i.e., the risk of tail events, and
(iv) probability of default of an agent. To measure market liquidity, first define market
volume by
volume :=
1
(N t − 1)
Nt∑
t=2
Na∑
i=1
|Di,t −Di,t−1| , (10)
i.e., the average amount of shares traded per timestep. N t denotes the number of timesteps
in one simulation run. In line with Amihud (2002) and references therein we define market
illiquidity as the ratio of market volatility to market volume. The intuition behind this
measure is that it quantifies how sensible prices react to a single unit of the asset changing
hands and thus how liquid a market is. To measure market volatility the standard
deviation of returns is evaluated and for market stability its respective (excess) kurtosis,
as a measure for extreme shifts in the price.13 Finally, the number of defaults of each run
is evaluated.
As a first result, Figure III.b visualises the resulting distribution of the relevant metrics.
On the x-axis the respective regulatory regime is coded: zero represents a regulation not
being in effect and one indicates it is. The first number corresponds to the short selling
ban, the second to a transaction tax and the third to the Value-at-Risk limit (VaR limit).
On the y-axis the respective measures of liquidity and stability are shown. Studying Fig-
ure III.b one can see that market illiquidity shows strong dependence on both short selling
restrictions and the Tobin Tax. Not only does market illiquidity rise, also its volatility
across runs is affected. The volatility of returns depicted in Figure III.b seems to be
mitigated by a short selling ban, while also a mandatory VaR limit contributes. Concerning
the kurtosis, there is less clear cut evidence. Its distributions are strongly skewed to the
13As large upswings do not pose a threat to financial stability, the kurtosis is evaluated from the distribu-
tion in which negative returns are flipped at zero and positive ones are ignored. It turned out that none of
the results depend on the flipping and the new measure is correlated by more than 0.89 with the standard
kurtosis.
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right – in fact, a few points lie far in the extreme tail, even overreaching 50. The number
of defaults is obviously affected by a short selling ban, which reduces their numbers strongly.
To assess the effects of regulatory measures more closely, illiquidity, standard deviation,
kurtosis and number of defaults are regressed on the exogenous dummy variables short
selling ban, VaR limit, Tobin Tax and respective interaction terms indicating the regulatory
measure to be in effect or not. As indicated by Figure III.b – especially the illiquidity plot
–, heteroskedasticity is an issue. Hence, the regression was conducted using feasible GLS14.
Table III.A displays the regression results with stars indicating statistical significance.
With an adjusted R squared of 0.94 the liquidity model manages to explain a relatively
high fraction of the endogenous variance. Note that all coefficients of the liquidity
regression were multiplied by 100 to enhance readability. Interestingly, all regulatory
measures reduce market liquidity, i.e., increase market illiquidity. The largest reduction in
market liquidity stems from an introduction of a short selling ban, while the introduction
of a Tobin Tax ranks second. According to the GLS coefficients, with a transaction tax
of 0.3%15 enabled a single stock traded causes a higher impact on prices, measured in
the standard deviation of returns by 0.00363.16 However, also surprising is the fact that
the combined introduction of a transaction tax and a short selling ban reduces liquidity
additionally to the individual liquidity effects.
As anticipated from Figure III.b, both, a short selling ban and a VaR limit, temper market
movements by reducing market volatility. The fact that VaR reduces market volatility
is an interesting finding since — as outlined in the introduction — VaR might also have
downside effects, as recently emphasized by e.g., Adrian and Shin (2008). On the one
14Alternatively, one can look at the quantiles of the resulting distributions. Find the respective quantile
regression results in the Appendix, Table III.D, page 62. In short, the picture modeling the median is
very similar both in terms of magnitude and significance of the parameters compared to the feasible GLS
regression results displayed in this section.
15See Table III.C on page 61 in the Appendix for the calibration used. Within the regression model all
exogenous variables are dummy variables.
16More easily interpretable is probably the respective coefficient for market volume (regression not de-
picted here), which shows that a transaction tax reduces the average amount of traded assets of a single
agent by 0.13 per timestep.
III. 4. Results 53
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
0.
02
0
0.
02
5
0.
03
0
0.
03
5
0.
04
0
Market Illiquidity
Regulatory Measures in Effect: ssban.TT.VaR
0.0.0 1.0.0 0.1.0 1.1.0 0.0.1 1.0.1 0.1.1 1.1.1
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
ll
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
2.
4
2.
6
2.
8
3.
0
3.
2
Standard Deviation of Returns
Regulatory Measures in Effect: ssban.TT.VaR
0.0.0 1.0.0 0.1.0 1.1.0 0.0.1 1.0.1 0.1.1 1.1.1
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0
5
10
15
Kurtosis of Returns
Regulatory Measures in Effect: ssban.TT.VaR
0.0.0 1.0.0 0.1.0 1.1.0 0.0.1 1.0.1 0.1.1 1.1.1
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
Defaults
Regulatory Measures in Effect: ssban.TT.VaR
0.0.0 1.0.0 0.1.0 1.1.0 0.0.1 1.0.1 0.1.1 1.1.1
Figure III.b: Distributions of market characteristics under different regulatory regimes. The
x-axis codes the regulatory measures being in effect or not by assigning 1 or 0.
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hand a VaR forces agents to unwind exposures potentially triggering market turbulence.
On the other hand, however, in a different market environment it helps mitigating market
turbulence as it prevents traders to take excessive risk positions in the first place. In this
set up the regression coefficient in Table III.A tells us that the latter effect is obviously
more dominant. Nonetheless, a closer look into the results reveals that the first increasing
effect on volatility is also present in our model: in simulation runs with the same random
seed, the one in which agents were subject to a VaR limit yielded in (only) 70%17 of the
runs a lower volatility. In the other 30% the measure led to higher market volatility.
More surprising is probably the fact that a Tobin Tax increases market volatility by a
statistically significant amount. In line with volatility, obligatory VaR limits remedies
huge swings in markets, as can be seen in the column of kurtosis. Likewise, tail events
occur more seldom when a transaction tax is introduced. Both effects are statistically
and economically significant. By contrast, a short selling ban positively influences the
probability of market crashes, via a prior build up of market bubbles. The fact that a
short selling ban reduces volatility while increasing the likelihood of tail events emerges
due to the absence of critical investors. Bubbles are nurtured in a calm environment
of low volatility, which leads to crashes when resolved. Put in medical terms: a short
selling ban seems to suppress the immune system. To visualize this interesting finding,
17These figures are totally, i.e., over all regulatory regimes. Considering no other regulation the figure is
68%, only a short selling ban being active 70%, only a transaction tax being active 74% and both being
active 73%.
exogenous illiquidity volatility (sd) kurtosis defaults
Intercept 2.169 *** 2.677 *** 2.16 *** 310.935 ***
VaR 0.007 *** -0.01 *** -0.186 *** -9.745 ***
ssban 0.373 *** -0.046 *** 0.344 *** -84.836 ***
TT 0.363 *** 0.022 *** -0.4 *** -3.225 ***
(VaR*ssban) -0.003 0 -0.08 3.883 ***
(VaR*TT) 0.005 . -0.003 . -0.008 -1.03
(ssban*TT) 0.055 *** 0.005 ** -0.165 ** 5.635 ***
(VaR*TT*ssban) 0 0.001 0.06 0.161
adj.R2 0.936 0.157 0.031 0.773
Significance Codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Table III.A: Results of feasible GLS regression.
III. 4. Results 55
Figure III.c displays a typical asset price movement under three regimes. At first, there
is hardly any difference in the price level and volatility is low. At a certain point prices
start to increase steeply. This is also the point where they start to move away across
regimes. While in the VaR regime and even in the unrestricted model price rises are
more modest, with short selling prohibited the price rises extraordinarily quickly. The
following fall comes certain and costs the default of four agents. Consequent wealth
effects cause a lower average price level in the following periods compared to the other
regimes. However, regarding the respective GLS coefficients of the interaction terms in Ta-
ble III.A, this dynamic is mitigated, when a short selling ban is combined with a Tobin Tax.
The number of defaults is negatively associated with all of the regulatory measures. By
far the strongest reduction comes from a short selling ban. This is easily explainable: with
short selling present in the market, the level of risk is much higher, as agents in a short
position would otherwise have no exposure. Additionally, they require a counterpart for
their position. Hence, the level of risk across the system is higher, therefore leading to
substantially more defaults.
While the result that a Tobin Tax increases volatility and reduces tail risk is interesting
in itself, one might be interested in how this conclusion changes when the tax level
varies (i.e., deviates from its standard value of 0.003). Indeed, e.g., Westerhoff (2003)
finds a dependence of the results on the level of the tax. Consequently, simulations
with a Tobin Tax of 0.1%, up to a level of 5% were run. Table III.B and Figure III.d
display the results. While there is only a modest increase in volatility noticeable up
to a level of 1%, volatility increases substantially above 1%. At 5% average market
volatility outreaches 10%, a substantial increase from its initial value. At the same
time, market volume is constantly reduced. As already noted above, a Tobin Tax has a
mitigating effect on tail risk in the model applied. This can also be seen in Table III.B,
where the kurtosis of returns is reduced by a Tobin Tax. However, there is — indeed
— a certain threshold, at which the medicine is overdosed: At a level of 2% the av-
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Figure III.c: Price dynamics display higher kurtosis under a short selling ban.
erage kurtosis overreaches 20 and market symptoms worsen at any higher level of the tax.18
Level of
Tobin Tax 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Volatility (sd)
mean 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.039 0.061 0.118
median 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.036 0.046
75%-quantile 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.085 0.176
Kurtosis
mean 2.700 2.078 2.197 2.766 2.377 27.504 67.261 28.912
median 1.847 1.746 1.392 1.023 0.912 1.933 6.237 6.364
75%-quantile 2.836 2.707 2.207 1.638 1.151 2.297 >100 >100
Table III.B: Statistics of returns under different levels of Tobin Tax.
What can we now learn from the results? First, the results show that in the chosen setting
a mandatory risk limit is the only measure that is beneficial from all perspectives19. A ban
on short selling reduces market volatility, but comes with an increase in tail risk. On the
other hand, a Tobin Tax reduces the occurrence of bubbles while at the same time makes
markets more volatile. However, when increased over a certain thresholds results turn and
18For a display of results across different regulatory regimes see Table III.E in the Appendix, page 63.
19Liquidity is omitted here.
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Figure III.d: Market characteristics under different levels of Tobin Tax. The values are means
across runs.
a Tobin Tax clearly contributes to market instability from all perspectives.
Second, the interplay of measures does play a role in judging on the regulatory medicine
to be prescribed. When a mandatory risk limit or a Tobin Tax is present, a ban of short
selling has significantly lower impact on tail risk than without. The column concerning
the number of defaults in Table III.A also indicates that regulatory measures can block
each other to some extent. While the interplay of these measures should not be left
unconsidered when deciding on their implementation, there is no evidence that they turn
individual effects in a different direction.
Of course, a relevant question is the robustness of the results. In fact, the model’s high
dimensionality of input parameters brings about the question, if the results are stable to
a different calibration. To find out, we run further simulation exercises varying key input
parameters, among them the number of agents and the distribution of the aggressiveness
parameter, β. The details about the parameter space of the modified variables can be
found in the Appendix, Table III.C, page 61 under the heading “Robustness Check”. The
investigation of whether the results described above hold was done by again regressing
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market illiquidity, volatility, kurtosis and defaults on the regulatory dummy variables and
— additionally — on the input parameters varied.20 The respective regression output is
depicted in Table III.F in the Appendix, page 6421. Summarizing, we find largely robust
results: still illiquidity is positively affected by all regulatory measures, market volatility
is still positively affected by a transaction tax, but negatively by a VaR or a short selling
ban. Concerning the kurtosis of returns, we see that while the coefficients associated with
a VaR and a short selling ban show their known sign, the transaction tax now displays
a positive sign, which is not in line with the primary findings shown in Table III.A, but
explained by the analysis of a transaction tax above 0.3% (see Table III.B). The number of
defaults shows the same dependence to the three regulatory measures as in the benchmark
model. Due to the higher number of observations, the p-values have generally decreased
impacting primarily the interaction terms. These show again similar behavior, with the
exception of the combined short selling ban and a transaction tax which now offsets part
of the negative individual liquidity effects (decreases illiquidity). For brevity, as concerns
the other regressors please refer to Table III.F.
Despite these promising results from the robustness exercise, one should bear in mind that
the model setup is an abstraction and that while it provides a range of features, certain
shortcomings remain: E.g., one could ask if there would be a change in results in case the
risk limits would only be applied by the largest agents or if their conception would be more
homogeneous across agents. Likewise, the question arises what if not the whole market
would be subjected to a Tobin Tax but tax havens are present. Furthermore, with a short
selling ban in place market participants might anticipate the absence of short sellers and
incorporate it in their demand decisions, thus mitigating the risk of bubbles.
20None of the conclusions drawn below depend on the fact that the varied input parameters were included
the regression.
21When comparing Table III.A and Table III.F, note that in the latter Tobin Tax is not coded as dummy
{0, 1} but in levels {0, 0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05} leading to a substantially different magnitude of
the respective coefficients.
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5 Conclusions
This paper introduces an artificial market where agents trade a single asset. The conception
of relatively rational agents allows for a straight forward implementation of regulatory
measures. These are a short selling ban, a Tobin Tax, a mandatory Value-at-Risk limit
and any arbitrary combination of these. In its unregulated version, the model is capable
of reproducing stylized facts of financial markets, most notably fat tails and clustered
volatility.
Introducing regulatory measures constitutes an intervention into a complex system, whose
consequences, side effects and joint interplay are ex ante unclear. The results described in
Section 4 constitute a reduction of market liquidity under each of the regulatory regimes.
A finding less surprising than the one concerning market stability: the results indicate
that only a mandatory risk limit is beneficial from every perspective, while a short selling
ban — though reducing volatility — increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for a
Tobin Tax: it reduces the occurrence of crashes but increases volatility — an outcome that
shows the importance of prior testing. However, when increased over a certain threshold
results turn and a Tobin Tax clearly contributes to market instability from all perspectives.
Furthermore, the interplay of measures is not negligible. Regression analyses show that
measures can block each other and a well-chosen combination can mitigate unforeseen side
effects.
However, further research is indeed needed to test the implications of regulatory measures
under a different model set up. The high complexity of financial markets makes this a
challenging task, but a feasible one considering the power of agent based simulation and a
worthy one considering the necessity for prior testing, as Dirk Helbing would argue.
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Appendix A
Table III.C presents the values used for simulation. The model was calibrated to fit roughly
weekly data of stock markets. Where possible, values from Thurner et al. (2009) were
used. Each run composes 4000 timesteps. One draw of ~t was used for every regulatory
regime in sequence.
Table III.D depicts the analogon to Table III.A, but instead of feasible GLS quantile
regression is used to model the medians of the market characteristics. Standard errors of
coefficients were obtained using bootstrapping methods. The values are strikingly close to
the ones of the feasible GLS regression.
Table III.E shows the results of a varying degree of Tobin Tax and varying regulatory
regimes in place (i.e., a short selling ban and/or a mandatory risk limit). For the
aggregated view (across all regimes) see Table III.B in Section 4, page 56.
The simulation was set up in R programming language (R Development Core Team 2011).
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exogenous illiquidity volatility (sd) kurtosis defaults
Intercept 2.172 *** 2.676 *** 1.821 *** 308 ***
VaR 0.007 ** -0.01 *** -0.199 *** -9 ***
ssban 0.368 *** -0.046 *** 0.283 *** -83 ***
TT 0.363 *** 0.021 *** -0.407 *** -3 ***
(VaR*ssban) -0.003 0 -0.051 3 **
(VaR*TT) 0.004 -0.004 . 0.024 -1
(ssban*TT) 0.055 *** 0.006 ** -0.125 ** 6 ***
(VaR*TT*ssban) 0.001 0.002 0.024 0
Significance Codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Table III.D: Results of quantile regression for the median.
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Level of
Tobin Tax 0 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Volatility (sd)
ssban=off & VaR=off
mean 0.0268 0.0268 0.0270 0.0276 0.0291 0.0311 0.0335 0.0424
median 0.0268 0.0268 0.0270 0.0275 0.0291 0.0311 0.0335 0.0424
75%-quantile 0.0271 0.0271 0.0273 0.0279 0.0294 0.0314 0.0340 0.0431
ssban=on & VaR=off
mean 0.0263 0.0263 0.0266 0.0272 0.0288 0.0308 0.0333 0.0424
median 0.0263 0.0263 0.0266 0.0272 0.0288 0.0308 0.0333 0.0424
75%-quantile 0.0267 0.0266 0.0269 0.0275 0.0291 0.0312 0.0338 0.0431
ssban=off & VaR=on
mean 0.0267 0.0267 0.0269 0.0273 0.0288 0.0463 0.0890 0.1915
median 0.0267 0.0266 0.0268 0.0273 0.0286 0.0312 0.0836 0.1756
75%-quantile 0.0270 0.0270 0.0272 0.0277 0.0289 0.0683 0.1025 0.2133
ssban=on & VaR=on
mean 0.0263 0.0262 0.0265 0.0270 0.0285 0.0462 0.0898 0.1967
median 0.0262 0.0262 0.0264 0.0270 0.0284 0.0309 0.0859 0.1757
75%-quantile 0.0265 0.0265 0.0268 0.0273 0.0286 0.0681 0.1015 0.2182
Kurtosis
ssban=off & VaR=off
mean 2.9987 2.0928 2.3827 4.7605 2.4309 1.9394 3.2479 4.9251
median 1.8204 1.7082 1.4136 1.0377 0.9532 1.8795 3.2058 4.8683
75%-quantile 2.7932 2.6700 2.2109 1.6856 1.2171 2.1333 3.5810 5.4066
ssban=on & VaR=off
mean 2.8150 2.2957 2.2823 3.2105 2.7176 1.9308 3.3086 4.9295
median 2.1041 1.9867 1.5727 1.1959 0.9412 1.8772 3.2650 4.8795
75%-quantile 3.1662 3.0241 2.4672 1.8577 1.1714 2.1391 3.6347 5.3922
ssban=off & VaR=on
mean 2.4366 1.8568 2.0085 1.1941 2.2026 >100 >100 >100
median 1.6215 1.5430 1.2379 0.8922 0.8696 1.9902 >100 >100
75%-quantile 2.5234 2.4760 1.9687 1.4305 1.0994 >100 >100 >100
ssban=on & VaR=on
mean 2.5490 2.0652 2.1160 1.8971 2.1578 >100 >100 >100
median 1.8530 1.7365 1.3694 0.9849 0.8784 1.9899 >100 >100
75%-quantile 2.8225 2.6501 2.1724 1.4909 1.1164 >100 >100 >100
Table III.E: Statistics of returns under different levels of Tobin Tax.
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Chapter IV
What Drives Aggregate Credit Risk?
Abstract
A deep understanding of the drivers of credit risk is valuable for financial institutions as
well as for regulators from multiple viewpoints. The systemic component of credit risk
drives losses across portfolios and thus poses a threat to financial stability. Traditional
approaches consider macroeconomic variables as drivers of aggregate credit risk (ACR).
However, recent literature suggests the existence of a latent risk factor influencing
ACR, which is regularly interpreted as the latent credit cycle. We explicitly model this
latent factor by adding an unobserved component to our models, which already include
macroeconomic variables. In this paper we make use of insolvency rates of Austrian
corporate industry sectors to model realized probabilities of default. The contribution of
this paper to the literature on ACR risk is threefold. First, in order to cope with the lack
of theory behind ACR drivers, we implement state-of-the-art variable selection algorithms
to draw from a rich set of macroeconomic variables. Second, we add an unobserved risk
factor to a state space model, which we estimate via a Kalman filter in an expectation
maximization algorithm. Third, we analyze whether the consideration of an unobserved
component indeed improves the fit of the estimated models.
JEL classification: E44, E32, E37.
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Keywords: credit risk, unobserved component models, state space, Kalman filter, stress
testing.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The enormous rise in the number of publications on credit risk over the last decades bears
testimony to an increasing interest in this topic. From a systemic perspective, the level of
aggregate credit risk (ACR) is of major interest as - in contrast to idiosyncratic (borrower-
specific) credit risk - it cannot be diversified away and is therefore a potential source of
financial instability. Although the nature of ACR suggests that it is primarily of concern
to regulators, central banks and supervisory authorities, more and more commercial banks
and other financial institutions seek a deeper understanding of ACR as this is essential
to managing risk, maintaining a sound capital planning process and applying meaningful
stress testing programs as well as a consistent approach to designing an adequate rating
model philosophy1. The value of structured products, or of any portfolio with non-zero
credit risk, is largely determined by their inherent systemic component - an important
point that should be clear after the 2008/2009 financial crisis.
In addition, the growing relevance of forecasting ACR is evident from the numerous stress
tests carried out by central banks around the world, as ACR forecasts constitute a precon-
dition for stress-testing. To be able to perform efficient system-wide stress testing, central
banks or any other supervisory authorities need a structured approach to forecasting ACR.
Hence, a profound understanding of ACR drivers is of high relevance for banks and super-
visors alike. Numerous papers have addressed this topic in recent years; inter alia Nickell
et al. (2000), Koopman & Lucas (2005) and Couderc & Renault (2005). However, any
approach to finding significant drivers of ACR faces two major challenges:
1. Given the lack of a clear-cut theoretical framework explaining the causes and driving
1See the distinction between point in time and through the cycle models e.g., in Heitfield (2005).
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factors of ACR in a financial system, a long list of macroeconomic variables is a priori
available for explaining ACR. Selecting among them becomes even more challenging
when taking the possible dynamic lag structure of these macroeconomic variables into
account.
2. At the same time, there is mounting evidence of latent factors driving (aggregate)
credit risk, as emphasized recently by Lown and Morgan Lown & Morgan (2004),
Jimenez & Mencia (2009), Koopman et al. (2009) and Bruche & Gonzalez-Aguado
(2010). With no directly measurable metric at hand, the question is how to incorpo-
rate this evidence into an econometric model.
In this paper we present an approach that deals with both of the above issues in a
state-of-the-art fashion. In order to manage the high number of possible explanatory
variables for ACR, we make use of advanced variable selection techniques (Hastie et al.
2009). We cope with the second issue by following the approach of Jimenez & Mencia
(2009) and Koopman et al. (2009), treating the credit cycle as a latent factor.
Since Kalman (1960) described a recursive solution to the discrete data linear filtering
problem (Kalman-Bucy filter), the idea of incorporating an unobserved state variable into
a state space model has led to an extensive amount of literature in various fields of science.
In economics, state space models are used as a very flexible tool in time series analysis.2
Harvey & Koopman (2009) give a short introduction into the various applications of
state space models in economics and finance. The most prominent applications are
macroeconomic models used to identify the natural rate of unemployment, permanent
consumption, the output gap or the expected rate of inflation, and time series models
such as trend-cycle decomposition and seasonal component models (Burmeister et al. 1986).
Only recently, state space models have drawn attention in credit risk-related research. The
respective papers aim at exploring the so-called “hidden”, “unobserved” or “latent” credit
2For example, to estimate their parameters, autoregressive moving average models, dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models and time-varying coefficient models can be put into a state space form.
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risk factors.In this paper, we use the expression latent risk factor to refer to the general
idea of including additional unobserved predictors in various models. In our models, latent
risk factors are added as unobserved components.
Crowder et al. (2005), Bruche & Gonzalez-Aguado (2010), Koopman et al. (2008) and
Banachewicz et al. (2008) aassume that the state variable (latent risk factor) is discrete
and the number of states is at least two (a “good” and a “bad” state). The resulting
models are commonly referred to as hidden Markov models.3 By contrast, Koopman &
Lucas (2005), Jimenez & Mencia (2009) and McNeil & Wendin (2007) choose a more
general approach in terms of state space by modeling it as a continuous state variable.4
This setup-up leads to the classical state space model described by Kalman (1960).
Nevertheless, there is no common theoretical view on the source and/or definition of latent
factors. They could be related to (a mixture of) general credit market conditions such
as the leverage and/or solvency ratios of creditors, collateral and other asset values or it
could, via the lending channel, supply adjunct criteria such as banks’ capital buffers and
lending criteria, etc. In any case, the latent factor should be a variable that is unobserved
(at least in our dataset), but still has a significant and persistent impact on credit risk. In
view of the recent financial crisis, one promising idea would be to relate the credit cycle to
the leverage cycle, as explicitly defined by Geanakoplos (2010) and Fostel & Geanakoplos
(2008). In their papers, they argue that a small initial drop in the value of assets and
collateral causes a big drop in the wealth of leveraged “optimists” which is then amplified
by forced sales and uncertainty.
A second credit cycle theory assumes the following relation between credit standards,
banking competition and the phase of the business cycle. In a nutshell, empirical studies
report that (too) lenient credit standards during an economic upturn result in the build-up
3See Rabiner (1989) for details on recursions and filter techniques which extract the sequence of hidden
in which only the state-dependent output variables are observed.
4A continuous state variable leads to more restrictions on other model assumptions, in particular on the
transition equation. See Minka (1999) for more details.
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of high credit risk, which materializes in the ensuing economic downturn.5 As analyzed by
Ruckes (2004), such behavior can be supported by banks’ profit-maximizing strategies in a
simple game theoretic setting. In line with his model, credit standards vary anti-cyclically
and therefore might enhance the influence of the macroeconomy on ACR. Third, the credit
cycle could be explained by the theory of cyclical default correlation (Giesecke 2004) which
can be understood as a partly systemic risk factor founded in the existence of direct ties
(e.g., financial, legal or client-supplier links) between firms.6
Our paper tests whether there is evidence for a latent effect on ACR. It builds on
previous work by Boss (2002) and Boss et al. (2009) describing the current OeNB
macro-to-probability of default models. We extend these OeNB models in two ways. First,
we add a new dimension to the discussion about the link between the macroeconomy and
credit risk measures by enlarging the set of possible macroeconomic predictors.7 We apply
advanced variable selection algorithms to find the best macroeconomic predictors for a
given model size. Second, we integrate an unobserved factor into the models via a state
space formulation, thus enriching them by explicitly modeling the hypothesized cycle. In
a next step, we interpret the sector-specific results. Finally, we evaluate the results by
comparing the state space model output with the output obtained from the traditional
models that are based on macroeconomic factors only.
2 Model Specifications
In this section we outline the econometric theory and estimation procedures behind the
models used to explain ACR. In terms of data, we use – in line with previous work by Boss
(2002) and Boss et al. (2009) — quarterly default frequencies rates from 1985 to 2011Q1
5See e.g., Lang & Nakamwa (1995) and Bonfim (2009).
6Such direct ties could lead to contagion effects that describe the default dependence between intercon-
nected corporates. See e.g., Eisenberg & Noe (2001).
7In a classical multivariate framework, this boils down to re-examining the trade-off between the bias
and variance of estimated results.
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provided by Kreditschutzverband von 1870 to approximate sectoral corporate probabilities
of default in Austria. These default frequency rates are calculated by dividing the number
of quarterly defaults by the total number of firms. The corporate sectors in question are
construction, production, trade, transport, tourism and services.8 The macroeconomic
variables used to construct our design matrix are taken from the OeNB’s macroeconomic
database. The set of explanatory variables {xj}kj=1 is extended by one to six lags of each
time series which multiplies the pool of candidate predictors.
ACCRONYM MEANING Transformation
ATX Austrian Traded Index YoY-Log-Difference
CPNReal Credit, private, amount outstanding, real YoY-Log-Difference
DDR Domestic Demand, real YoY-Log-Difference
GONReal Gross operating surplus, real YoY-Log-Difference
HIC Harmonised index of consumption prices YoY-Rel-Difference
IER Equipment investment, real YoY-Log-Difference
IOR Other investment, real YoY-Log-Difference
LTIReal Long-term real interest rate No Transformation
MTR Imports, real YoY-Log-Difference
PCR Private consumption, real YoY-Log-Difference
POIL Oil price in EUR YoY-Log-Difference
PRO Average labour productivity YoY-Log-Difference
PSNReal Private sector savings, real YoY-Log-Difference
PYR Private sector disposable income, real YoY-Log-Difference
STIReal Short-term real interest rate No Transformation
URX Unemployment rate YoY-Rel-Difference
WURYD Compensation per employee, real YoY-Log-Difference
XTR Exports, real YoY-Log-Difference
YER GDP expenditure, real YoY-Log-Difference
Table IV.A: Possible explanatory macroeconomic variables. Up to 6 quarterly lags are also
considered for each variable.
As a starting point for modeling ACR, we look at the linear observable macroeconomic
factor model:
yi,t = β0,i +
k∑
j=1
xj,t βj,i + i,t, (1)
where yi is the logit-transformed sectoral default frequency rates
9 (i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., 7}), k is
8Corporate sectors are classified according to NACE Rev. 2, the classification of economic activities
applied throughout the European Union. See Zeller et al. (2008) for more details.
9The logit transformation ensures that the default frequency rates used remain within the interval (0; 1).
A probit transformation would serve the same purpose. Other popular approaches to modeling dependent
ratios without transforming them include the fractional logistic regression by Papke & Wooldridge (1996)
IV. 2. Model Specifications 74
the number of macroeconomic predictors and t ∈ {1, 2, .., T} constitutes the time index.
xj is the j
th transformed macroeconomic predictor.
How to Select Explanatory Variables?
Let us now address the first issue raised in the introduction: As, in our opinion, general
equilibrium literature on credit markets does not provide the sufficient theoretical back-
ground for deriving explanatory variables, the list of candidate predictors is extensive and,
as a consequence, candidate predictors might even outnumber observations. In previous
work on the topic, regressors have been selected by mere qualitative reasoning (e.g.,
Jimenez & Mencia 2009 and Koopman et al. 2008). Boss et al. (2009) group the variables
into thematic sets and allow only one variable from each set to be selected. In order to
deal with the high variance-versus-low bias trade-off in a nonheuristic way, we depart from
these qualitative approaches and consider a data-driven subset selection mechanism.
One of the available subset selection algorithms is the so-called Best Subset Selection10
which selects for each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., p} the subset of size k that gives the smallest residual
sum of squares. The variance-versus-bias trade-off is directly linked to the choice of k
and is therefore a discrete mechanism. With respect to model interpretation, Best Subset
Selection offers the choice of k input variables from the set of p variables. However, a severe
drawback is the computational cost of this method. The fact that the number of possible
models increases exponentially with p, puts a relatively low bound on feasible values of p
(p < 50) even with a fast algorithm such as the leaps and bounds procedure at hand.11
Consequently, the application of Best Subset Selection would require a preselection of
the variables considered above, especially when one wants to account for a dynamic lag
structure.
and beta regression models (Ferrari & Cribari-Neto 2004). A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different approaches to modeling dependent ratios would be beyond the scope of this paper.
10See Hastie et al. (2009) for details.
11See Furnival & Wilson (1974) for details.
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Alternatives to this approach are Forward- and Backward-Stepwise Selections12. Forward-
Stepwise Selection starts with an intercept and sequentially adds the regressors which
contribute most to an improvement of the fit (as measured e.g., by the Bayesin information
criterion, BIC) until k variables are selected (Hastie et al. 2009). Backward-Stepwise
Selection starts with the full model and sequentially drops the least important variables in
terms of model fit until k variables are reached. While not as computationally demanding
as Best Subset Selection, these algorithms might not select the “optimal” set from the
perspective of the minimal residual sum of squares. A comparison between Best Subset
Selection and Forward Stepwise Selection applied to different subsamples of our dataset
shows that the two mechanisms produce relatively similar results. As Backward Stepwise
Selection requires the number of candidate predictors to be smaller than the number of
observations, p < T , a preselection of variables - as in the case of Best Subset Selection -
would still be necessary to make the selection procedure applicable.
As a third alternative selection procedure Shrinkage Methods13 appear to be promising.
In contrast to subset selection, shrinkage methods do not retain or discard a variable but
“shrink” the regression coefficients by imposing a penalty on their size. For example,
the elastic net procedure proposed by Zou & Hastie (2005) is a shrinkage method
which uses a convex combination of the L1 (lasso) and the L2 (ridge regression) norm
as the penalty restriction in the standard minimization of the sum of residual squares
(with respect to the vector β) to estimate Equation (1). While promising at first
sight, the combination of shrinkage methods with the estimation of latent factors (see
below) requires a largely revised estimation procedure and is beyond the scope of this paper.
By way of summary, we find that Best Subset Selection and Backward Stepwise Se-
lection both require a preselection of variables, while shrinkage methods do not, in
general, allow for including latent factors within the state space framework.14 There-
12See Hastie et al. (2009) for details.
13See Hastie et al. (2009) for details.
14The question of how to combine the elastic net algorithm with an unobserved component in a Bayesian
framework is currently being examined in an ongoing research project.
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fore, we will use Forward Stepwise Selection, which does not require any form of variable
preselection and shows a promising performance in simulation exercises (Hastie et al. 2009).
How to incorporate the unobserved credit cycle?
In a next step we extend our macroeconomic factor model by “latent risk factors”. Moti-
vated by the discussion presented in Section (1) we add an unobserved risk factor to the
framework of Equation (1) and will refer to this new equation as the measurement equation
Measurement Equation (2). We explicitly model the latent credit cycle as an autoregres-
sive state process that evolves through time and refer to this specification as the State
Equation (3).
yi,t = Xi,t Γi + zi,t λi + vi,t vi,t ∼ N (0, ri) (2)
zi,t = zi,t−1 φi + wi,t wi,t ∼ N (0, qi) (3)
In addition to the previous notation, λi,Γi, φi, qi and ri are parameters to be estimated,
zi,t is the unobserved factor, and vi,t and wi,t are error terms. Capital letters denote
vectors or matrices and small letters scalars. Moreover, we assume that Cov(vi,t, wi,t) = 0
and that there are no cross correlations in the state and measurement equation between
the sectors i, Cov(wj,t, wi,t) = 0 and Cov(vi,t, vi,t) = 0 for any i 6= j.
We estimate the Equation System (2) and (3) via an expectation maximization algo-
rithm (EM algorithm)15. Based on an initial set of parameters (λi,Γi, φi, qi and ri) the
unobserved component is extracted via the Kalman filter in the expectation step. Given
the unobserved component zi the likelihood of Equation (2) is maximized with respect
to the parameter set. These steps are repeated until convergence.16 However, the state
space representation of a given dynamic system might not be uniquely defined by a given
15See McLachlan & Thriyambakam (1996) for details.
16See Shumway & Stoffer (2006) and Holmes (2010) for details.
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parameter set λi,Γi, φi, qi, ri without restricting some of these parameters. This can be
seen from the fact that the likelihood function of the equation system would remain
unchanged when multiplying Equation (3) with any non-zero factor or nonsingular matrix
— it would simply measure the unobserved factor on a different scale.17 Consequently, we
fix the metric of the unobserved variable by restricting qi = 1 without loss of generality.
3 Results
In this section we present evidence of the relevance of the latent factor in our dataset as
well as an analysis of the most frequently selected variables. For this purpose we estimate
models for each of the corporate sectors under review with a varying number of explana-
tory variables. The explanatory variables are chosen by applying the Forward Stepwise
Selection method described in Section 2. For each number of explanatory variables ranging
from 1 to 15, we estimate the top five models according to their explained sum of squares,
which results in 75 models per sector.18 Additionally, to gain insight into the importance
of latent factors for explaining ACR, we estimate these models with and without an un-
observed component. To compare the respective results, we follow Koopman et al. (2009)
and conduct a likelihood ratio test defined by
2(lu − lr) ∼a χ2m, (4)
where lu represents the likelihood of the unrestricted model with the latent factor and lr
the restricted models without this factor and m the number of restrictions implemented.
In our case, the only imposed restriction is λi = 0.
Is a Latent Factor Present in Aggregate Credit Risk?
17For more details see Hamilton (1994) and Carro et al. (2010).
18Thus, models of different sizes do not compete with each other, and applying any selection criteria such
as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) would result in the
same selection of variables.
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To judge whether latent factors are statistically significant, Figure IV.a plots the likelihood
ratio statistics for all models per sector, with the x axis representing the number of
included predictors per model. Note that for each given number of explanatory variables,
five models are estimated. The horizontal line in each plot represents the 99%-critical value
of the χ2-distribution.19 Thus, values above the line indicate a statistically significant
contribution of the latent factor to the model fit and can thus be interpreted as evidence
for the existence of an unobserved component. The results shown in Figure IV.a are quite
surprising: While there is evidence for a latent factor in smaller models, i.e., models with
about 1 to 7 explanatory variables, this evidence clearly vanishes when considering models
of larger size.20
This behavior is similar in all sectors with the exception of construction. Especially
in the production sector, any significant contribution of the estimated unobserved
component series is lost early (in terms of model size). As the model fit obtained
by the variables selected by the algorithm alone is already rather high, it cannot be
significantly improved by the unobserved component. A similar pattern is visible for the
service, trade, transportation and tourism sectors. The construction sector constitutes
an exception in this context since here, including a latent factor results in a more
persistent significant improvement of the model fit. However, for model sizes beyond
a certain threshold the improvement of the model fit is insignificant in this case as
well. We relate this finding to the fact that the construction sector mainly consists of
corporates working in structural and civil engineering. While the main customers in struc-
tural engineering are households, a large portion of orders in civil engineering is publicly
assigned and could thus cause the behavior of this sector to differ from that of other sectors.
All in all, the results described above are somewhat surprising. On the one hand, it is
19From a strictly statistical point of view the results, especially the critical values resulting from the
LR test, have to be taken with caution. First, they are only asymptotically valid. Second, we treat the
likelihoods of the restricted models without explicitly conditioning them on the model selection criterion.
20To a very large extent, our LR test results can be confirmed by applying the BIC, which explicitly takes
the length of the time series into account.
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Figure IV.a: Likelihood ratio statistic (y-axis) versus number of included explanatory variables
(x-axis) for all corporate sectors (varying y-scale!). The grey horizontal line represents the
99%-critical value of the χ2-distribution.
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obvious that the inclusion of more variables reduces the space that a time series estimated
by the Kalman filter technique can fill. On the other hand, the model sizes discussed
here are far from “large” and there is ample literature underlining the importance of
the inclusion of a latent factor in the model (e.g., Lown & Morgan 2004, Jimenez &
Mencia 2009, Koopman et al. 2009 and Bruche & Gonzalez-Aguado 2010). One important
distinction between our approach and e.g., the approach followed by Jimenez & Mencia
(2009) and Koopman et al. (2009) is that they selected variables by mere qualitative
reasoning. The set of macroeconomic candidate predictors considered in previous work is
generally smaller than in our models. Jimenez & Mencia (2009) for instance, only consider
real GDP growth, interest rates and, in an enlarged set-up, also bond spreads and a
sector-specific additional variable, while Bruche & Gonzalez-Aguado (2010) only consider
real GDP growth.
In a closer examination of the difference between previous findings in the literature and our
findings, we set up a downsized macroeconomic environment in which we only include real
GDP growth, short- and long-term interest rates and inflation — all up to six lags. With
this much smaller macroeconomic variable set, we conduct Best Subset Selection21 for
model sizes from 1 to 15 for each sector. Figure IV.b presents the results, which are easily
summarized: In all sectors there is substantial evidence of a significant improvement when
considering the Kalman series irrespective of the size of the model. Clearly, our results
show that an enriched dataset combined with a modern selection technique like Forward
Stepwise Selection is able to capture dynamics that are otherwise deemed unobserved.
Which Fundamentals Drive Aggregated Defaults?
An additional question is which macroeconomic variables are selected by the forward
selection algorithm. For this purpose, we point to Figure IV.c and Table IV.B. Figure IV.c
presents the frequency with which estimated models contain a certain explanatory variable
21We chose Best Subset Selection as it is computationally feasible for this smaller set of explanatory
variables and superior to Forward Stepwise Selection since Best Subset Selection finds the optimal model
among all possible models.
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or its lagged cousin, thus indicating its importance in explaining aggregated defaults in the
individual sectors. The respective black bar represents the fraction in which this variable
has a positive coefficient.22 Hence, in the construction sector, for instance, the variable
HIC23 (inflation) - or any of its lags - was selected in about 90% of all models and nearly
always had a positive sign.
A closer look at Figure IV.c reveals interesting results. In all sectors but construction,
funding costs such as the real short-term interest rate (STIReal), the real long-term
interest rate (LTIReal) but also inflation/ (HIC) and real private credit growth (CPNReal)
play an important role.
First, the explanatory variable LTIReal appears very frequently in models explaining
defaults in the production, trade and tourism sectors. The sign of its coefficient is positive
in the majority of cases, indicating rising defaults when LTIReal is high. Clearly, a higher
interest rate raises the cost of funding in these sectors. In contrast, the service and trans-
portation sectors seem to be affected by STIReal. An intuitive explanation for this finding
is that these sectors rather tend to be financed by short-term lending and are thus more
vulnerable to STIReal. While this interpretation seems plausible for the service sector, the
negative signs of coefficients for the transportation sector suggest a different background:
STIReal might be a timely indicator of economic activity. Hence, a reduction of STIReal,
which is highly correlated with the central bank’s target rate, might be a first indicator
of an economic downturn, which would increase the default rate in the transportation sector.
Furthermore, in the same five sectors (all but construction) HIC has a positive influence on
aggregate defaults in the majority of cases. As stated by Qu (2008), the role of inflation in
firm defaults can be examined from two perspectives: first, the perspective of prices that
22In cases in which the algorithm chose a dynamic lag structure, i.e., the variable appeared more than
once in one equation due to the lag specification, the black bar shows the number of models for which the
sum of the respective coefficients is positive.
23Abbreviations as quoted in Table IV.A denote the variables transformed as indicated in the right-hand
column of the table.
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Figure IV.b: Likelihood ratio statistics (y-axis) versus number of included explanatory vari-
ables (x-axis) for all corporate sectors (varying y-scale!). The grey horizontal line represents
the 99% critical value of the χ2 distribution. It is important to note that we only include four
possible candidate predictors (STIReal, LTIReal, HIC and YER).
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Figure IV.c: Frequency of selected variables. Black bars show the fractions assigned to positive
coefficients for the particular macroeconomic variable.
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companies charge for their goods and services and second, the perspective of factor prices.
Higher prices of goods and services ceteris paribus increase earnings and thereby improve
a company’s creditworthiness. Higher factor prices lead to increased production costs
and tend to weaken creditworthiness — a fact which implies an increase in credit risk.
Additionally, higher inflation is also a proxy of economic uncertainty. In our dataset, the
second effect obviously dominates the first, leading to positive coefficients in the majority
of models.
Additionally, in all six sectors CPNReal has a solely negative coefficient. Even in the
construction sector, the model inclusion probability is above 30%. Although this result is
in line with Bonfim (2009), many studies on credit risk especially in developing economies
search for a positive coefficient of credit growth. The theoretical assumption is that rapid
credit growth in boom phases might lead to higher defaults in immediately following
downturns.24 With regard to the Austrian corporate credit market, we clearly cannot
support this hypothesis. However, we do not include dummies for rapid credit growth
and/or consider lags up to several years as other studies do.25 The negative sign in our
results can be interpreted as follows: In good times, productive investment projects arise
and companies might at least meet their short-term payment obligations - a circumstance
which, ceteris paribus, reduces the number of insolvencies.
Aside from the above, the variable YER (real GDP growth), is frequently selected with
a negative sign in the production sector.26 Moreover, the variable GONReal (real gross
operating surplus growth), surprisingly, enters more than 70% of the production models
with a positive sign. In the construction sector, the selection algorithm selected the
variable PCR (real private consumption) with the expected negative sign in about 90% of
all models. This highlights the influence of housing construction, a segment of construction
24See Jimenez & Saurina (2006) and Bank for International Settlements (2010).
25See Foos et al. (2010) and Berger & Udell (2004) among many other papers.
26Interestingly, YER seems to be of importance only in the production sector. However, in many other
sectors direct subcomponents of YER, such as XTR (real export growth) or PCR, are selected and indicate
that the additional information contained in YER does not significantly contribute to explaining aggregate
credit risk.
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whose main customers are households. Second, the variable POIL (oil price) enters over
90% of the models with a positive sign.
A particularly interesting finding is that the oil price also constitutes an important
driver of defaults in the transportation sector as it defines the price of the main input
good. In line with findings for other sectors, PCR is selected with the expected negative
sign in more than 90% of the models. In addition, a further transportation-specific
variable emerges: XTR (real export growth) proves to be important in the transportation
sector. Clearly, more exports lead to more business activity and thus reduce the level of risk.
The aggregate insolvency rates in the service sector are influenced by a couple of variables,
which reflects the fact that services consist of 38 different NACE sectors.27 Aside from the
general variables (STIReal, LTIReal, HIC and CPNReal), the most prominent additional
variables are the real growth of compensation per employee (WURYD) as well as real
other investment growth (IOR). The negative sign for WURYD indicates that households’
income growth is a good proxy for more corporate revenues that lead to lower credit risk.
Additional variables in the trade sector are real equipment investment (IER) growth, real
other investment (IOR) growth and real domestic demand (DDR) growth. As Figure IV.c
shows, investment growth (IER, IOR) appears to be more important in the trade sector
than in other sectors. In most models, the expected negative sign can be observed.
Finally, tourism is the only sector in which real private disposable income growth (PYR)
is selected with a negative coefficient in more than 70% of the models. This clearly shows
that households spend their higher disposable income on holiday activities, which causes
revenues in the tourism sector to go up and insolvency rates to go down. Summing up,
we find a number of variables which drive ACR across multiple sectors and are thus par-
ticularly crucial for understanding ACR. These variables include inflation, interest rates
and (negative) credit growth. Furthermore, we identify sector-specific variables, such as
27See Zeller et al. (2008) for more details.
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Prod. Service Constr. Trade Transp. Tourism
rel. + rel. + rel. + rel. + rel. + rel. +
ATX 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0.22 0.61 0.44 0.45
CPNReal 0.84 0 0.89 0 0.29 0 0.76 0 0.89 0 0.97 0
DDR 0.39 0.39 0 0 0 0 0.73 0.75 0.03 0.03 0 0
GONReal 0.76 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.61 0 0.03 0.03 0.03 0 0.08 0.04
HIC 0.91 0.91 0.99 1 0.01 0 0.97 1 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.89
IER 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.89 0.29 0.48 0 0 0
IOR 0.07 0 0.71 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.01 0 0.44 0
LTIReal 1 1 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.85 0.88 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.95
MTR 0.24 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0 0 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.04
PCR 0.03 0.01 0.44 0.01 1 0 0.03 0.01 1 0 0.03 0
POIL 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.92 0.92 0 0 0.77 0.99 0.23 0.23
PRO 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.62 0.83 0.83 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.03 0.79 0.81
PSNReal 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.01 0.04 0.01
PYR 0 0 0.03 0 0.09 0.08 0 0 0.04 0 0.71 0
STIReal 0.03 0 0.77 0.78 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.49 0 0.03 0.03
URX 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.36 0.56 0.56 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.3
WURYD 0.09 0 0.68 0.03 0.35 0 0.05 0.03 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.64
XTR 0.07 0.03 0.49 0.38 0.56 0.56 0.01 0 0.55 0.03 0 0
YER 0.72 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.2 0.01 0.03 0 0.08 0
Table IV.B: Frequency of Selected Variables and Respective Fraction of Positive Coefficients.
exports in the transportation sector or investment in equipment in the trade sector, which
highlight the importance of taking sectoral differences into account when analyzing ACR
in corporate sectors.
4 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the determinants of aggregate credit risk (ACR). On the one hand,
we explicitly measure the importance of latent risk factors via a state space system for
different corporate sectors and model sizes. On the other hand, we evaluate the influence
of observable macroeconomic variables in different corporate sectors by analyzing the
choices of the Forward Stepwise Selection procedure.
We find that enhancing a macro-to-probability of default model by incorporating a latent
risk factor only improves the model considerably if the model is allowed to select from a
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small number of possible predictors. We show that this finding is not explained by the
selection procedure applied but is attributable to a limited set of variables. The limited
number of included variables also explains why some of the relevant literature finds strong
support for including unobserved risk factors in macro-to-probability of default models.
As pointed out in the introduction, the literature has not yet agreed upon a meaningful
economic interpretation of the credit cycle as an unobserved credit risk factor. Mainly
on the basis of the likelihood ratio tests performed, we conclude that the significance
of the explanatory value of the unobserved factor depends on the number and quality
of the macroeconomic variables that are selected as predictors. Since the results for
the construction sector show that influential observable predictors might not always be
available, there is (state) space open to different credit cycle theories. At the same
time, the inclusion of an unobserved component into an ACR model comes at little
methodological costs. When forecasting aggregate levels of credit risk, it therefore seems
to be prudent to work with a state space model.
Coming back to the credit cycle theories mentioned in the introduction, we think that
the second theory, which assumes that (too) lenient credit standards during an economic
upturn result in the build-up of high credit risk which then materializes in the ensuing
economic downturn, seems not to apply to the highly competitive Austrian banking
sector.28 This view is supported by the negative coefficient of credit growth (CPNReal) in
all corporate sectors observed. Since this paper analyzes the Austrian corporate sector,
we are not in the position to judge whether the credit cycle can be interpreted as the
leverage cycle, which would require the modeling of ACR for mortgage loans in the retail
sector. Finally, among the above-mentioned credit cycle theories the cyclical default
correlation hypothesis seems to be the most promising option in support of our findings.
The persistent importance of the unobserved factor in the construction sector for different
models sizes underpins this argument as direct ties between firms in the construction
28High competition in the lending market generally results in low net interest margins. These, in turn,
require strict lending standards which generally rule out subprime lending.
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sector are often observed.
Moreover, we find several variables which drive ACR simultaneously in a number of sectors
and are thus particularly crucial for modeling ACR. These variables include interest
rates, inflation and (negative) credit growth. However, there are also considerable sectoral
differences between the selected variables. Among the sector-specific variables we find e.g.,
the oil price and exports in the transportation sector, equipment investment in the trade
sector and short-term interest rates in the service sector. Most of the selected variables
show the expected sign in the regressions performed and can be explained by general
economic theory and/or by specific sectoral economic conditions. Overall, our analysis
suggests that only an enlarged set of macroeconomic variables can explain ACR in a
comprehensive way - and a comprehensive explanation of ACR is without doubt crucial
for the development of macroeconomic scenarios for stress-testing exercises.
Our findings also clearly indicate that taking model uncertainty into account is of high
importance in a field where, a priori, many regressors constitute candidate predictors for
explaining ACR. We accounted for model uncertainty by estimating 75 models for each cor-
porate sector. However, there are more sophisticated statistical methods to perform model
averaging. In particular the concept of Bayesian model averaging could be a promising
advancement for future research projects.
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Chapter V
Model Uncertainty and Aggregated
Default Probabilities: New Evidence from
Austria
Abstract
Understanding the determinants of aggregated default probabilities is crucial for both
financial institutions and supervisors and thus has attracted substantial research over the
past decades. This study addresses a major difficulty in understanding the determinants of
aggregate probabilities of default: Researchers must choose among many potential models
and decide which regressors to include or exclude. Due to the lack of clear guidance from
theory, researchers must apply expert knowledge. Thus, model uncertainty is present
blurring the view on default drivers. This paper presents Bayesian Model Averaging
(BMA) as a powerful tool that overcomes this difficulty. Furthermore, we supplement
BMA with ridge regression to mitigate multicollinearity arising from the consideration
of lagged explanatory variables. This framework allows us to account for the complex
relationship between the macroeconomy and firms’ defaults by drawing from a rich set of
macroeconomic variables. After introducing the statistical methods we apply our approach
to an Austrian dataset. Our findings suggest that factor prices like short term interest
rates and energy prices constitute major drivers of default rates, while firms’ profits reduce
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the expected number of failures. The advantage of BMA becomes evident as we identify
drivers of defaults which constitute a component of another macro variable, like investment
as component of GDP or energy prices as component of inflation — variables which might
not have passed the expert’s inclusion decision. Finally, we show that the results of our
baseline model are fairly robust to the choice of the prior model size.
JEL Classification: E44, C52, E37.
Keywords: Bayesian Model Averaging, model uncertainty, ridge regression, credit risk,
firm defaults, stress testing.
1 Introduction
Understanding the driving factors of aggregated probabilities of corporate defaults is an
important topic both for financial institutions and supervisors. For example, conducting
meaningful stress tests requires the translation of macroeconomic scenarios into portfolio
losses. The same applies when financial institutions and supervisors are interested in
forecasting the credit quality of portfolios on an aggregated level. Both in the field of macro
prudential supervision and strategic risk management knowledge of the determinants of
aggregated defaults is crucial.
Consequently, estimating the link between macroeconomic variables and probabilities
of defaults has been a long-standing topic in research, as numerous papers testify (see
below). However, the classical approach of regression faces a major challenge: Due to the
sparse theoretical framework of how firm defaults are linked to specific macroeconomic
variables, researchers are compelled to draw on their intuition which macro variables to
include or not. Such a procedure neglects the uncertainty in the model choice and might
end up with wrong conclusions. This challenge, commonly known as model uncertainty, is
a problem shared with many other empirical fields of research. In what follows we present
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a state-of-the-art statistical approach of dealing with model uncertainty, a combination of
Bayesian Model Averaging and ridge regression which we then apply to Austrian data.
Motivated by the high interest in the topic from industry and supervisors, there is a
growing body of literature examining the relationship between firm defaults and economic
conditions. Altman (1983) uses augmented distributed lags to demonstrate the effect of
GNP, money supply and corporate profits on firms’ ability to survive. Altman (1984)
presents a survey discussing different business failure models that have been tested and
developed outside the United States. Liu & Wilson (2002) use a time-series model to
construct measures showing that interest rate and insolvency legislation are important
variables in explaining firm bankruptcy. Similarly, Virolainen (2004) regresses Finnish
sector-specific default rates on macroeconomic indicators like GDP, interest rates and
levels of corporate indebtedness. Liu (2004) uses an error-correction model to investigate
the macroeconomic determinants of UK corporate failure rates. Liu (2009) extends this
research by implementing a vector error-correction model specifically accounting for policy-
induced changes in the macroeconomy, concluding that macro variables like the interest
rate and inflation impact firm failures. Simons & Rolwes (2009) use macroeconomic-based
models for estimating default probabilities using a Dutch dataset. Additionally, they
compare their results with Austrian data. They conclude that for both countries their
model delivers different results, deducing that their provided model is country specific.
Further contributions are Koopman & Lucas (2005) who analyze the co-movement of
credit and macro cycles in the US and Foglia et al. (2009) who examine Italian default
frequencies per sector.
Screening the literature reveals that authors have to rely on expert knowledge when deciding
upon the inclusion or non-inclusion of macro variables. To the best of our knowledge,
uncertainty about the correct model specification for aggregated probabilities of default has
not explicitly been addressed yet. The approach we present here refrains from assuming
that there is one “true” model but instead averages over a huge number of potential models.
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This approach is known as Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) (see Hoeting et al., 1999).
Thereby, the researcher controls the model size via a prior model inclusion probability for
each variable1. Sampling from the set of regressors BMA then computes a huge number
of models, which are weighted by their marginal likelihood and subsequently averaged.
This simple procedure reveals important determinants of the dependent variable and their
respective coefficients.
As noted above, BMA is becoming a central tool applied in dealing with model uncertainty,
or in general settings with large numbers of potential regressors and relatively limited
numbers of observations (see Ley & Steel, 2009). In the literature on growth determinants
Fernandez et al. (2001) and Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004) propose BMA to identify robust
drivers of countries’ average growth. Wright (2008) and Avramov (2002) use BMA to
forecast exchange rates and stock returns respectively. Empirical results have shown that
BMA might outperform single model in prediction (see Hoeting et al., 1999).
However, at least in our case highly correlated candidate variables (multicollinearity)
constitute an issue to be accounted for. To some extent this fact arises due to the inclusion
of lagged explanatory variables, which display a particularly high correlation. To explicitly
deal with this correlation structure we supplement BMA with a shrinkage method, ridge
regression (Hoerl & Kennard, 1970b,a). Ridge regression aims at avoiding the commonly
observed characteristic upon inclusion of highly correlated variables: coefficients display
high absolute magnitudes which are canceled out by coefficients of correlated cousins of
comparable magnitude with reversed sign. By adding a penalty term dependent on the
size of coefficients ridge regression indeed overcomes this issue.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological
approach outlined above, i.e., BMA and ridge regression. We then apply this approach in
1The approach we follow here attaches the same prior inclusion probability to each variable (see Sec-
tion 2). However, in general the researcher could attach a higher probability to variables deemed to be of
special relevance.
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Section 3 and Section 4, whereby the former presents the dataset and the latter the results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and provides discussion on further research.
2 Model Specification and Estimation
In the following subsections we give a brief overview of the methods we apply. First,
we highlight the advantage of ridge regression. Second, we refine our methodology by
introducing the spike and slab approach, a specific BMA technique, to account explicitly
for model uncertainty.
In order to introduce the methodological approach presented in this paper, we start with
the familiar framework of linear regression. Here, we assume that the relationship between
the logit transformed aggregated default rates, as response variable, y (N × 1) and the
design matrix of the explanatory variables (here the macro variables) X (N ×K) is given
by the linear regression
y = Xβ + , (1)
where  ∼ N(0, σ2IN ). The vector β denotes the parameter vector of interest. As-
suming that the explanatories X are highly correlated the standard OLS estimator
βˆ = (X′X)−1X′y might be ill-conditioned (multicollinearity). In particular, at least
one of the eigenvalues ηk of X
′X will move towards zero, inflating the variance of the OLS
estimator E((βˆ − β)′(βˆ − β)) = σ2∑K η−1k .
2.1 Ridge Regression and Bayesian Ridge Regression
Ridge regression (see Hoerl & Kennard, 1970b) belongs to the class of shrinkage methods
in the context of linear regression models. In contrast to well known subset selection
algorithms (e.g., Forward Stepwise Selection) it does not retain a subset of predictors and
discard the rest but shrinks the size of predictors proportionally in accordance with their
importance (Friedman et al. 2009). To see why this is so valuable, imagine the usual setup
V. 2. Model Specification and Estimation 98
of highly correlated variables in the design matrix leading to large positive and negative
coefficients and thus to unreliable results. Indeed, multicollinearity may result in poorly
determined parameters. One way to deal with multicollinearity is the use of ridge regression.
From a frequentist point of view, ridge regression solves the optimization problem
βˆridge = argmin
β
(y −Xβ)′(y −Xβ) + λ
K∑
j=1
|βj |2
 . (2)
The Lagrangian parameter λ defines how much the classical OLS–βs are shrunk. If λ moves
towards 0 then the constraint is not binding and one arrives at the OLS solution. As for
OLS, it is possible to give a closed solution of the ridge regression problem, which is given
by
βˆridge = (X′X + λI)−1X′y. (3)
The ridge regression solution is very similar to the OLS solution (except for the term λI) and
is linear in the response variable y. The proportional shrinkage of the ridge parameters via
the L2 norm in Equation (2) provides the ability to cope with correlated variables as large
coefficients are penalized. Clearly, a precondition of ridge regression is the standardization
of regressors in order to treat variables measured on different scales equally. An analogous
approach to ridge regression is available in a Bayesian setting. Bayesian ridge regression
was first introduced by Hsiang (1975). Keeping the assumptions of linear regression and
setting λ = σ2/τ2 one implements the following hierarchical Bayesian model:
y|β, σ2 ∼ N(Xβ, σ2In), (4)
where the prior specifications of the coefficients β is given by
β|τ2 ∼
P∏
j=1
N(0, τ2), (5)
with proper priors2 for the variances σ2 and τ2.
2Any inverted gamma prior for σ2 and τ2 would maintain conjugacy. Here we use the limiting improper
priors 1
σ2
, respectively 1
τ2
.
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The prior on β conditional on τ and the fact that y ∼ N(Xβ, σ2In) allows for the use
of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling to estimate the posterior distribution of
interest.
2.2 Model Uncertainty
As outlined in the introduction, an important task in statistical modeling is the choice of an
optimal model from the set of all possible models. With K potential explanatory variables,
one faces 2K possible combinations of regressors. Selecting the best model out of 2K linear
models is a challenging task. In addition, several models with similar performance might
arise which does not allow for an unambiguous single best choice. Thus, the uncertainty
associated with a selected model is an important aspect, especially when it comes to fore-
casting (see Steel, 2011). One natural way to deal with model uncertainty is to pool over
the considered models — as BMA does. Thereby, weights of the single models depend on
how much the data support each model via the posterior distribution. An excellent review
of BMA is given in Hoeting et al. (1999). Using BMA, one obtains the distribution of some
quantity of interest β, e.g., the effect of a macro-variable, by averaging inference over all
models Mk
P (β|Z) =
2K∑
l=1
P (β|Ml,Z)P (Ml|Z), (6)
where P (Mk|Z) is the posterior probability of model Mk given the whole dataset Z (X
and y combined) and is derived by
P (Mk|Z) = P (Z|Mk)P (Mk)∑
l P (Z|Ml)P (Ml)
, (7)
where P (Mk) is the prior probability of model Mk and P (Z|Mk) is the marginal or inte-
grated likelihood of model Mk obtained by integrating over the parameters (see Hoeting
et al., 1999). Suitable choices of prior inclusion probabilities P (Mk) allow to control the
expected model size, i.e., the number of included parameters. In order to sample different
models Mk of varying size and average across them, we make use of spike and slab priors
(Mitchell & Beauchamp, 1988; George & McCulloch, 1993, 1997).
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2.2.1 Model Uncertainty via the Spike and Slab Approach
The central point in using spike and slab priors is to assign each coefficient a prior which
is a mixture of a point mass at zero and a specified “slab” distribution. This allows to
exclude variables from the regression. In this sense spike and slab constitutes an optimal
supplement to ridge regression which alone does not provide variable selection. Formally,
we modify the prior defined in Equation (5) and use for all considered regressions discussed
in this work a coefficient prior of the form
P (βj |cj , τ, σ2) ∼ (1− cj)I0 + cjpi(τ), (8)
where cj is a binary random variable with success probability γ = P (cj = 1) (which we
set to the same value for all candidate regressors j). pi(τ) is the prior distribution of βj
defined by Equation (5).
The Posterior Inclusion Probability (P (cj = 1|Z) or PIP3) of each variable j contains
valuable insights about the importance of variable j. In particular, the PIP is of high value
as it displays the fraction of models visited in which variable j was selected, P (cj = 1|Z).4
PIP can thus be understood as a measure of “posterior importance” of a given variable and
is a widely used measure in Bayesian Model Averaging (see Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004).
2.2.2 Model size
We have not yet discussed in detail the specification of the prior variable inclusion probabil-
ities used by the spike and slab approach in Equation (8). One possible approach would be
to assign each variable βj an uninformative inclusion probability of γ = 0.5, i.e., cj is drawn
from a Bernoulli distribution Be(0.5). This has the odd and troubling implication that we
assume the number of included variables to be very large (see Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004).
In particular, the expected model size, E[Mj ], equals K × 0.5, where K is the number of
3For convenience we omit subscripts to PIP throughout this paper.
4See Mitchell & Beauchamp (1988).
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candidate regressors. In our case, as explained below, we have 160 candidate regressors to
choose from, K = 160, which would results in a very large prior model size, E[Mj ] = 80.
Models of this size are uncommon as researchers and practitioners prefer smaller models.
Therefore, instead of choosing one value for the prior model size, we specify a range of
values for prior mean model sizes k¯, with each variable having a prior inclusion probability
of γ = k¯/K, independent of the inclusion of other variables. We estimated our models for 9
different expected prior model sizes, k¯ ∈ {5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 22, 28, 40, 80} resulting in the prior
inclusion probabilities shown in Table V.A.
k¯ 5 7 9 11 16 22 28 40 80
γ 0.031 0.044 0.056 0.069 0.1 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.5
Table V.A: Prior model size and associated prior inclusion probabilities for the single variables.
We follow Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004) in assuming that most researchers strongly prefer
models containing a large number of variables so we will concentrate on models with prior
model sizes between 5 and 16 variables. This is also in line with the fact that most empirical
models on aggregated default rates (see Simons & Rolwes, 2009; Liu, 2009) use moderate
numbers of explanatory variables. Our benchmark model will have the prior model size of
k¯ = 7. While we calculate results for large models as well, we will not focus our attention
on these cases when it comes to interpretation.
2.3 Estimation
In order to estimate our models, we used Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.
In particular, the Gibbs sampler ran for 200, 000 iterations, using a thinning of 10. The
first 10, 000 draws were discarded as burn-in period. This results in 19, 000 draws from the
posterior for each parameter of interest. All the computations are done using JAGS (Just
another Gibbs sampler) and its R (see R Development Core Team, 2011) interface packages
rjags (see Plummer, 2011). MCMC diagnostic is done with the package coda (see Plummer
et al., 2010).
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3 Data
We now apply the presented framework of BMA with ridge regression to analyze aggregate
default probabilities in Austria. A common approach taken in the literature (see e.g.
Simons & Rolwes, 2009; Foglia et al., 2009, among many others) is to use firm default
frequencies as proxy for default probabilities. We follow this line by basing our analysis on
quarterly corporate insolvency frequencies for the period between January 1987 and April
2011. These insolvency rates are aggregated over all Austrian corporate sectors and are
calculated by dividing the number of quarterly defaults by the total number of firms, which
results in quarterly aggregated default rates, pd. The number of firm defaults and the total
number of firms were obtained from the Austrian creditor association Kreditschutzverband
von 1870. As noted above, we transform default rates via the logit function, i.e.,
y := logit(pd).
The set of potential explanatory variables contains 32 different macroeconomic variables
which are taken from the database of Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB).5 These
macroeconomic variables are part of the Austrian Quarterly Forecast Model (AQM) and
are used for forecasting by the OeNB twice a year. As this dataset reflects the variable set
of a macroeconomic forecasting model, our results can be used to integrate the time-series
of credit defaults into the macro-model, or implement a stress testing framework building
on the respective macroeconomic forecasts.
Another advantage of using this dataset is that the list of candidate regressors covers
multiple aspects of the economic environment. We consider financial regressors, like
interest rates, the stock index and credit amount outstanding, private sector indicators,
e.g., private consumption and disposable income, as well as general and external trade
related variables, like GDP, exports and investment. Additionally, various price indicators,
like the harmonized consumer price index or the oil price, are included.
5The only exception is the ATX, Austrian Traded Index, which was taken from Datastream.
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This large set is even further increased by adding lags up to 4 quarters of each candidate
regressor, hence resulting in a design matrix X containing 160 explanatory variables each
with 97 quarterly observations. The variable names, the applied transformation as well as
two of their autocorrelation coefficients are illustrated in Table V.B. The variables included
were transformed as indicated in column 2 in Table V.B to ensure stationarity of the time-
series. “YoY-Log-Difference” equals a transformation of the original time-series, Xt, by
logXt−logXt−4, “YoY-Difference” by Xt−Xt−4 and “YoY-Rel-Difference” by (Xt/Xt−4)−
1 where t is the time indicator in quarters.6
4 Results
In this section we present the results from the combined approach of BMA with ridge
regression described in Section 2 applied to the Austrian dataset. To assess variable impor-
tance, we calculate the posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP). These are a central quantity
within BMA to measure a variable’s importance (see Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004). In line
with prior research (and intuition), we focus on variables with a higher PIP than their prior
inclusion probability, i.e., variables that are deemed more important after consideration of
the data. Additionally, means and standard deviations of the coefficients — conditional on
model inclusion — are displayed.
4.1 Macroeconomic predictors of firm failure rates: Baseline estimation
We are now ready to present the baseline estimation results with a prior model size7 of 7.
We find a posterior mean of 10.12, which is clearly above the prior model size and suggests
that the posterior puts more importance on models with more explanatories.8
6Note that this transformation is followed by a standardization (subtraction of mean and division by
standard deviation) within the ridge regression.
7Note that as described in Section 2.2.2 a prior model size of 7 does not mean each model includes
exactly 7 variables, but that each candidate regressor has a probability of inclusion, which yields on average
a model size of 7.
8For the sake of completeness we provide here posteriors related to the shrinkage parameter (see Sec-
tion 2.1). We find for the shrinkage parameter λ = σ2/τ2 a posterior mean of 0.72012, whereby flat
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NAME MEANING TRANSFORMATION MEAN SD
PD Aggregated default rates logit -5.309 0.186
No Transformation 0.005 0.001
LAG1 LAG4
ATX Austrian Traded Index YoY-Log Difference 0.797 0.041
CPN Nominal private credit, amount outstanding YoY-Log-Difference 0.891 0.401
DDR Real domestic demand YoY-Log-Difference 0.923 0.454
GEI Government interest payment YoY-Log-Difference 0.881 0.033
GON Nominal gross operating surplus YoY-Log-Difference 0.862 0.001
HEG HIC for energy YoY-Difference 0.750 -0.263
HEX HIC for non-energy YoY-Difference 0.863 0.437
HIC Harmonized index of consumption prices YoY-Difference 0.830 0.164
IEN Nominal equipment investment YoY-Log-Difference 0.876 0.003
IER Real equipment investment YoY-Log-Difference 0.884 0.042
ION Nominal other investment YoY-Log-Difference 0.881 0.040
IOR Real other investment YoY-Log-Difference 0.881 0.040
ITR Real total investment YoY-Log-Difference 0.861 0.042
LNN Total employment YoY-Difference 0.868 0.200
LTI Nominal long-term interest rate No Transformation 0.970 0.834
MTN Nominal imports YoY-Log-Difference 0.887 -0.004
MTR Real imports YoY-Log-Difference 0.909 0.120
PCN Nominal private consumption YoY-Log-Difference 0.958 0.638
PCR Real private consumption YoY-Log-Difference 0.957 0.669
POIL Oil price in EUR YoY-Difference 0.702 -0.411
PRO Average labor productivity YoY-Log-Difference 0.869 0.093
PSN Nominal private sector savings YoY-Log-Difference 0.788 -0.082
PYN Nominal private sector disposable income YoY-Log-Difference 0.896 0.379
PYR Private sector disposable income, real YoY-Log-Difference 0.849 0.167
STI Nominal short-term interest rate No Transformation 0.969 0.780
URX Unemployment rate YoY-Rel-Difference 0.779 -0.205
WIN Nominal total compensation to employees YoY-Log-Difference 0.959 0.685
WURYD Real compensation per employee YoY-Log-Difference 0.866 0.302
XTN Nominal exports YoY-Log-Difference 0.871 -0.037
XTR Real exports YoY-Log-Difference 0.880 0.020
YEN Nominal GDP YoY-Log-Difference 0.914 0.291
YER Real GDP YoY-Log-Difference 0.892 0.188
Table V.B: Set of candidate regressors. Additionally, up to four quarter lags are considered
for each variable. The columns LAG1 and LAG4 display the autocorrelation coefficients for one
and four quarters.
Table V.C presents the results of our analysis: The first column reports the PIP of the
variables within the applied BMA framework. We sorted the variables in decreasing order
of PIP and print only those which have a PIP greater than the prior inclusion probability.
From Table V.C we infer that the 3-month interest rate lagged by four quarters (STI L4)
(uninformative) hyperpriors on τ2 and σ2 were assumed. The posterior means of the variances σ2 and τ2
are 0.11893 and 0.16516 respectively.
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has the highest PIP. Its posterior mean coefficient (P.MEAN) is positive and in line with
standard economic theory that higher costs of funding imply higher PDs. Similarly, higher
interest rates do not only increase the cost of funding but also prevent firms form receiving
further funding due to bank lending standards, thus triggering firm failures. This finding
is in line with previous literature. Vlieghe (2001), Liu & Wilson (2002) and Liu (2009)
among many others report this strong and positive dependence between firm defaults and
interest rates.
Interestingly, the second most important variable is the unlagged short term interest rate,
STI, which has a negative posterior mean. The fact that the unlagged short term interest
rate is negatively related to firm defaults is to the authors’ knowledge a common puzzle
in empirical works on aggregate credit risk (see e.g., Ali & Daly 2010 or Divino et al.
2008). However, there is an economic interpretation for this result. STI are usually highly
correlated with central bank fund rates and these tend to be raised in economic boom
phases to avoid overheating. Thus, higher short term interest rates are a timely measure
for economic activity. Clearly, in economic good times PDs tend to decline.
On the third rank we find energy prices with a lag of one year, HEG L4. Energy prices
constitute an essential determinant of factor prices and thus obviously pose a very relevant
risk factor from the perspective of firms. Its posterior mean of 0.084 indicates a positive
relationship between defaults and rising energy prices. This finding illustrates the power
of BMA. While numerous papers have identified inflation as a determinant of aggregated
default rates (see e.g. Foglia et al., 2009; Virolainen, 2004), we find a component of
inflation, energy price rises, as one major factor. Owing to the application of BMA one
is able to include components of indicators instead of the aggregates such as inflation or
GDP yielding more precise conclusions.
The fourth most important variable according to its PIP is nominal import growth (MTN).
To find imports among the top ranks is surprising as respective literature usually refrains
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to include it. However, the positive sign of the coefficient can be supported by several
arguments. Firstly, imports by corporates are expenses. Ceteris paribus higher expenses
increase the default probability. Secondly, more imports by private households could
substitute domestic products which decrease the average revenue of domestic corporates.
Thirdly, the time-series of imports might also catch exchange rate fluctuations to some
extent, which in turn appear in papers as in Foglia et al. (2009) and Bhattacharjee et al.
(2009).
The fifth (and tenth) highest PIPs can be observed for PRO L1 (PRO), the log difference
of the average labor productivity. While the interpretation is less straight forward, it
might be that an increase in labor productivity drives those firms out of the market which
can not adopt such a productivity shock in their business strategy.
Furthermore, on the following ranks we find GON, gross operating surplus, and WIN, total
compensation to employees. Both variables have the expected sign of the posterior mean.
GON measures profits of firms which intuitionally lower firm defaults and is also reported
in previous findings (see e.g. Liu, 2004; Liu & Wilson, 2002). WIN is the aggregate sum of
wages paid out and according to our findings reduces the probability of a firm’s default. It
is important here to stress the difference to the variable WURYD, real compensation per
employee, which appears on rank 13 with a lag of one year and a positive coefficient. While
WURYD measures compensation per employee, WIN is the total sum across the economy.
While seemingly related, there are important distinctions which also come apparent when
regarding their opposite signs of posterior means. First, WURYD is measured per employee
making it inversely related to the general employment level — or put differently, WIN is
positively related to the general employment level, which constitutes another important
variable at rank 19, LNN. Also, the finding of a positive coefficient on real compensation
per employee confirms the results presented in Vlieghe (2001). Another difference is the
time index with which both variables enter. While WIN enters without lag, thus reflecting
more contemporary conditions, WURYD enters with a lag of 4.
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On the ranks 8 to 9 we find government interest payments (GEI) and investment (ION).
Both variables were selected in approximately 30% of the visited models. As the negative
sign of ION indicates, investments reduce the number of defaults in the economy as also
reported by e.g., Boss et al. (2007). Two channels may be responsible for this fact. First,
investments reduce the number of firm defaults as they are a proxy for fresh equity induced
into corporates. Second, it may also be that in times few firms default, managers decide
to invest more, which results in a mutual dependence of both variables.9 However, the
fact that investment enters with a lag of 2 (compare Table V.C) speaks in favor of the
first channel. The appearance of GEI is less anticipated. The positive sign of its posterior
mean (together with a relatively small posterior standard deviation) tells us that in times
of high interest payment from the side of the government defaults tend to increase. Poten-
tially, this finding reflects the increased economic uncertainty when sovereign spreads rise.
Koopman & Lucas (2005) report a positive dependence of default rates with aggregated cor-
porate spreads. As such a variable is missing in our dataset, GEI potentially acts as a proxy.
Beyond the “top 10”, variables already discussed like other nominal investment, ION, and
total employment, LNN, appear. In the majority of cases variables as well as posterior
means are plausible from an economic perspective. However, private consumption, PCN,
lagged by 4 quarters enters in most models with a positive sign. This puzzling finding may
be explained by the fact that its unlagged cousin, private real consumption, PCR, enters
with a negative sign at rank 16 (and further on rank 21 and 22). High private consumption
one year ago might cause too optimistic turnover predictions on the side of firms, which
begin to falter once stock levels do not sell. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact
that contemporaneous (real) private consumption enters with the expected negative sign.
At the same time it is not only interesting to look at variables that were selected frequently,
but also at variables that were not selected. Among those we find for example ATX, the
9In that case endogeneity of the variable would be present rendering the interpretation as a driver for
(fewer) firm defaults incorrect.
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Austrian Traded (stock market) Index. As the majority of firms are small enterprises,
little (or no) dependence on stock market returns is plausible. Less anticipated is the fact
that classical macroeconomic variables, especially GDP or disposable income, play also a
minor role. In our model setting the data do not support their inclusion which confirms
the findings of Simons & Rolwes (2009). However, this underlines the existence of model
uncertainty and therefore the need for averaging over sets of possible models. Indeed, as
noted above, by applying BMA we find components of general indicators, like investment
of GDP and energy prices of inflation, as major risk drivers. BMA thus allows for a deeper
insight into the matter of firm default determinants.
4.2 Model size robustness
So far, we presented the results of our baseline estimation with a prior model size of
k¯ = 7. Although we believe that models with 7 expected variables are reasonable, this
choice is somewhat arbitrary and the effects of using different prior model sizes need to be
explored. For the 30 most substantial variables in the baseline model, Tables V.D and V.E
present the PIP and posterior means given inclusion of different prior model sizes. The
prior inclusion probabilities are simply given by the choice of k¯ divided by the number
of possible variables, K = 160. For each prior model size, variables which appear within
the 10 most substantial variables are printed in bold. Variables that are substantial in the
baseline model but not when other priors are in use are printed in italics.
In total we find three variables which appear within the 10 most substantial variables for
all considered model sizes. These are STI L4, WIN and GEI. From Table V.E we can infer
that the signs of the variables are consistent across the different model sizes. Solely for two
variables, PCR L4 and WURYD, we find for the prior model size k¯ = 80 controversial signs
compared to the other considered models10. A summary of Table V.D is also displayed in
Figure V.a where we show PIPs of the top variables in the benchmark model across the
10These variables are ranked 52 respectively 35 in the baseline model and appear therefore not in Ta-
bles V.D and V.E.
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Figure V.a: PIPs for top variables in the benchmark model (in black) and less important
variables (in grey) across varying prior model sizes. The dotted line illustrates the prior inclusion
probabilities γ. For the x-axis a logarithmic scale is used.
range of prior model sizes.
Variables tending to lose importance when increasing prior model size. Four
variables tend to lose importance — by dropping out of the “top 10” — when increasing
the prior model size. These are STI, MTN, PRO L1 and GON. Moreover, PRO L1 even
becomes unsubstantial for prior model sizes above 40. This suggests that such variables
could be acting as “catching-all” for various other effects (see Sala-I-Martin et al., 2004).
That means in smaller models these variables capture several effects and mechanisms in
a combined form, while in larger models, these effects are broken up as more regressors
are added. As a matter of fact, this in turn implies that when interpreting coefficients one
has to focus even more on the partial character of the coefficient, i.e., measuring the effect
given the inclusion of other regressors.
A good example is STI, unlagged short term interest rates, which becomes less substantial as
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we increase the model size (see Figure V.a). For prior model sizes k¯ = 40 respectively k¯ = 80
STI appears on the 34th respectively 44th rank, while for our benchmark model it appears
on the 2nd rank. On the other hand, variables like PCN (nominal private consumption,
lagged 4 quarters), PCR (real private consumption), ION (nominal investment) and LNN
(total employment) become more important for larger prior model sizes. This nourishes
the hypothesis that short term interest rates might be a “catch all substitute” for private
consumption and investment. The fact that PCR, ION and LNN enter without lag, i.e., in
their contemporaneous form, also supports the interpretation mentioned before – that STI
is a proxy of economic activity in smaller models.
Variables becoming “top 10” when increasing prior model size. Within the
most substantial variables we find some variables which do not appear within the “top
10” set of the baseline model, but seem to become “top 10” when changing the prior
model size. Nevertheless, all these variables are substantial in the baseline model (that is,
show a higher PIP than prior inclusion probability) and are mostly ranked between the
11th and 20th rank in the baseline model k¯ = 7. These are nominal private consumption
(PCN L4), real compensation per employee (WURYD L4), both lagged by one year, total
employment (LNN), total compensation to employees (WIN L3) lagged by 3 quarters,
private consumption rate (PCR) and nominal investment (ION). Additionally, we find
the variables real domestic demand (DDR), its one year lagged values11 (DDR L4) and
nominal total compensation to employees (WIN L4), lagged by one year, appearing as
“top 10” variable for some considered prior model sizes.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we propose a fully Bayesian approach combining ridge regression and BMA
to determine which macroeconomic variables are substantially related to aggregated prob-
abilities of default. Compared to the literature which mainly focuses on one single model,
11DDR L4 is ranked 39 for our baseline model and ranked 10 for the model k¯ = 80 with a PIP of 0.6193.
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our approach addresses the problem of model uncertainty. Additionally, we propose ridge
regression to deal with multicollinearity, an immanent problem in case lagged variables
are included. In our benchmark model the most frequently selected candidate regressors
indicate that firms’ factor prices play a key role in determining defaults. Energy prices and
interest rates lagged by one year are positively related to defaults in nearly all sectors. On
the other hand, indicators of economic activity, like investment and contemporaneous short
term interest rates, are associated with fewer firm defaults. As expected, firms’ profits
reduce the expected number of failures. Interestingly, classical macroeconomic variables,
like GDP or disposable income, are less frequently selected. This finding underlines the
need for an approach capable of dealing with model uncertainty — a feature Bayesian
Model Averaging perfectly provides.
Finally, we show that the results of our baseline model are fairly robust to the choice
of the prior model size. More precisely, when increasing the prior model size, variables
do not change the sign of their posterior mean (with only 2 exceptions in 54 substantial
variables considered). Moreover, most of the “top 10” variables remain within the 20
most important variables for other estimated prior model sizes. However, the relative
importance of some regressors does change. This finding suggests that some variables
being of high relevance in smaller models act as proxy for multiple effects combined which
can be successively split into its components when considering models of larger size.
Further research is needed to better understand the dynamics of firm failures, a highly
relevant time-series for regulators and banks alike. On one hand, the application of sta-
tistical approaches robust to model uncertainty should be applied on a dataset of wider
geographical coverage. In line with the findings of Simons & Rolwes (2009) country specific
circumstances need to be analyzed. Also, our methodological framework allows for the
considerations of (even) more candidate regressors. On the other hand, form a method-
ological perspective our approach could be revamped in a way that allows the examination
of common sets of variables. This would allow analyzing substitutional and complementary
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effects between the explanatories. That is, asking not only which variables were selected,
but also which variables were selected together.
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